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A CODE OF THEIR OWN: UPDATING
THE ETHICS CODES TO INCLUDE THE
NON-ADVERSARIAL ROLES OF FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS
ROBERTA K. FLOWERS *
The appalling thing about a war like this is that it kills all love
of truth.
—George Brandes, The World at War'
The trial process in America has been referred to as "a battle of
adversaries"' or "legal combat."" The adversarial system assumes that
truth emerges from the confrontation of opposing views. In its earliest.
form, brought to England by William the Conqueror, the accused
would physically battle with his accuser.' The underlying belief was that
"[hi eaven would give the victory to him who was in the right."5
 The
modern criminal justice system perpetuates this legacy and is premised
on the assumption that the adversarial model is an effective method
of finding the truth." Even the scholars who question the effectiveness
* Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. B.A., Baylor University, J.D.,
University of Colorado, I would like to thank Patricia Logan and Robert Batey for their comments
on the previous draft. Special thanks also goes to Robert Biitsotti and April Dill.
1 GEoRGE BRANDES, THE WI. MIA/ AT WAR 162 (1917) (quoting letter to Georges Clemenceati,
Prime Minister of France (March, 1915)). Brandes's comments were made in response to Cie-
menet:res criticism that the Danish gciveriunent had refused to involve itself in the war. Brandes
goes on ti point out that In lo one doubts for an instant that its cause is the just one and
deserving of victory." Id.
James A. Ithnkovicz, Au Advenary .System Dry intse of the Right to Counsel Against Informants. :
Truth, Fair Play and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. Davis L. REV. I, 65 (1988); see also CHARLES
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL Kill ins 565 (1986) (indicating that "baidelike characteristics that have
survived in trials are atavistic emergences of the hinnan qualities that the micial arrangement nil
trials was meant to replace").
3 Fred Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: theory, Practice and the Para-
digm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REY. 223, 230 0993). Judge Frankel maintains
that during trials the "pervasive air of combat" surrounds the judge, forcing him into the role of
"a combatant with a shifting but endless series of OppOMMLS." MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN
JUSTICE 47 (1980).
4 .JosEmt F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: LAW, PROCEDURE, FORMS 8 /1.8
(1985).
5 id. The trial by combat or wager of war was abolished by the Act io Abolish Appeals of
Murder, Treason, Felon or Other Offenses and Wager of Battle 1819. Id. (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("The system assumes that
adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness."); Mackey v.
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of the adversarial system as a truth seeking device justify it as a great
protector of rights or, at least, an attempt to keep the government at bay.'
Whatever justification the adversary system has in the trial process,
this justification does not apply to the investigative stage of a criminal
case. 8
 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the
question of when the adversarial process begins, concluding that the
process does not, and should not, begin prior to charging the defen-
dant.' The adversarial system fails to enhance the truth-seeking proc-
ess, and hinders the investigative process before all facts are known. By
prematurely forcing the prosecutor into the position of advocate, the
system places obstacles in the way of information gathering. Adversar-
ies are not likely to fully disclose all relevant facts to their opponents.
Although the prosecutor has always performed a unique role
within the criminal justice system, the "peculiar"i° nature of the federal
prosecuting attorney's work is most pronounced in the investigation.
At the early stages of the investigation, offenses are often not defined,
nor offenders identified. In determining the offense and the offender,
the investigating attorney should act not as an advocate but as a neutral
fact finder. In the investigation stage, the goal of truth must be para-
mount"
Historically, the prosecutor has played a limited role in the inves-
tigation of cases. The focus of law enforcement had been, traditionally,
on street level crime involving discrete criminal episocles. 12
 The prose-
cutor's role was to present the evidence that had been ferreted out by
law enforcement agencies." There were fewer and less complex fed-
eral cases.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) ("[O]ur legal tradition regards the adversary process as the best
means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the risk of error."); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
360 (1977) ("[Dlebate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-seeking function of
trials.").
7
 See infra text accompanying notes 162-78.
8
 See infra text accompanying notes 147-78.
See infra text accompanying notes 179-233.
1 ° Justice Sutherland talked about the peculiar nature of prosecution in his classic description
of the job. stated, "As such, [the prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer" Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934).
JosEP11 D. GRAN°, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 24 (1993) (indicating that "tension
between truth, discovery and other goals should be resolved in a way that leaves truth a dominant
goal of the procedural system").
12
 Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision of
the Right to Counsel, 105 BARN. L. REV. 670, 674-70 (1992) (discussing change in role of defense
counsel in light of change from discrete criminal episodes to those involving organized crime).
Cf. Jerry E. Norton, Government Attorneys Ethics in Transition, 72 JunicAnnw 299, 301
(1989) (concluding that large complex cases are invoking prosecutors in investigation).
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Changes in the scope of federal criminal statutes, in the selection
of cases investigated and in the methods of investigation have ex-
panded the prosecutor's role.'`' The number of federal crimes has
grown astronomically over the last two decades, from 115 federal crimes
in 1975 15 to 3,000 federal crimes in 1994. 16 Federal criminal laws con-
cerning search and seizure, electronic surveillance and related issues
have become more intricate.' 7 Today, the prosecutor enters cases in-
volving organized crime, public corruption and large drug organiza-
tions much earlier because most inquiry is conducted using subpoenas
and grand jury interviews.'s Furthermore, the methods of investiga-
tion, including intricate undercover operations, are more complicated,
requiring law enforcement agencies to seek both the advice and the
authorization of the prosecuting attorney. 19 The federal prosecutor of
today occupies a predominant role in the investigation. 2"
The current rules of professional conduct fail to recognize the
expanded role played by the government attorney in the investigation
of federal crimes and do not provide sufficient guidance for the gov-
14 Deputy Attorney General Gorelick, appearing before the Judicial Conference Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure in January 1995, explained that in recent years the federal
criminal investigations and prosecutions have become more complex and th[tt governmenI
lawyers have become more involved, especially in undercover operations. See Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes (Jan. 12-14, 1995).
18 JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR 'ELIE UNITED STATES: U.S. ArFORNEYS IN THE POLFEICAL
AND LEGAL. SYSTEMS 9 (1978).
16 Sara Sun Beale, Too Many Yet 'Jim Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal
Criminal fitrisdiction, 46 FlAsTiNcs L.J. 979, 980 (1995); see also William W. Schwarzer & Russell
R. Wheeler, On the Federalization of the Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 S'irrsoN
L. RF,v. 651, 652 (11194) (noting growing concerns of Federal judges over federalization of state
crimes).
With the increase in the number and type of crimes prosecuted within the federal system,
the number or attorneys prt .)suctiting federal crimes has also multiplied. Between 1983 and 1992,
the number of attorneys employed by United States Attorneys' Offices doubled from less then
2,000 in 1983 to 4,291 in 1992. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT: UNITED STATES
AITORNEYS' OFFICES FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 1 (1993).
The United States Department of Justice (''DQJ 8) budget has increased accordingly, from
$2.3 billion in 1981 to $9.3 billion in 1993. Jim McGee, War on Crime Expands U.S. Prosecutor's
Powers: Aptressive Tactics Put Fairness at Issue Series: The Appearance of justice Sends Numbers: 1/6,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 10, 1993, at Al.
17 Ronald Goldstock, The Prosecutor as Problem-Solver: Leading and Coordinating Anticrime
Efforts, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1992, at 3.
18 Between 1992 and 1994, although the number of proceedings decreased, the number of
attorney work hours devoted to grand jury proceedings increased. U.S. DEP'T or JUSTICE, STA-
TISTICAL REPORT: UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' OFFICES FISCAL YEAR 1994, at 5 (1995).
19 For a description of a complicated undercover investigation, see JAMES B. STEwAgT, Tint
PitosEctirroxs: TVIE OFFICES OF THE GOVERNMENT'S MOST POWERFUL LAWYERS 87-133
(1988) (describing undercover operation involving sale of trade secrets to foreign corporations).
° Bennett L. Gershman, 'Ike New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. Rya:. 393, 395 (1992).
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ernment attorney's behavior. 2 i The rules are premised on the adver-
sarial model of dispute resolution and ignore the daily situations that
a government attorney faces during the investigation of a case. Re-
cently, the defense bar has attempted to expand general rules regard-
ing attorney conduct to cover the non-adversarial actions of the inves-
tigating attorney. Nowhere are these attempts more obvious than in
the debate over Model Rule 4.2, sometimes called the "anti-contact
provision" of the code. 22
 The disagreement comes from a lack of defini-
tion of the role played by the federal attorney in the investigation of
an offense and from the tendency of the defense bar to view the
government attorney as an adversary, not as a "minister of justice."
This article, rather than also consider state and local prosecutors,
focuses on federal prosecutors because of their increasingly active role
in investigations." State and local prosecutors generally play a less
active role in the investigation stage of the criminal case because of the
nature of state criminal laws, 24
 the cases prosecuted and the lack of
resources available to undertake protracted investigations. 25
 Therefore,
many of the issues raised regarding the investigative stage of a criminal
case arise more frequently for federal prosecutors than for state prose-
cu tors. 2"
2I Throughout this Article I will refer to the American bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Where there are distinctions,
I will note the distinctions. As to the statement that the rules are premised on the adversarial
model of disupte resolution, however, there is no distinction and therefore I will refer to them
generically as rules of professional conduct or ethics rules.
22 Roger C. Cranium & Lisa R. Udell, ,State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Contro-
versies over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. L Rsv. '291,202 (1992).
23
 See infra text accompanying notes 76-92.
21
 Of course, the roles state prosecutors play may differ depending on the geographical
location they represent. ,fee JOAN JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PRosEcuToR: A SEARCH FIR IDENTITY
273-95 (1980) (documenting differences between urban prosecutor's office and suburban or
rural offices).
23 The federal prosecutor is mote often involved in a proactive case, one in which the crime
is on-going, such as a racketeering case, a public corruption case or a case involving organized
crime. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Judge John Gleason, The Federalization of Organized
Crime: Advantages if Fede.ral Prosecution, 46 1-1ANTINGs L.J. 1095,1098 ( I 995). The state prosecutor
is much more likely to become involved in a case after the completion of crimes, which is called
a reactive case. Id. The kinds of offenses prosecuted in the state system are likely to be discrete
offenses. Id. Additionally, this diversity is due, in part, to the quantity of cases handled by the
state system. Id. The state prosecutor struggles to prosecute cases involving crimes already
committed with little time to devote to investigating fut ure crimes. Id.
Allbough this Article examines the federal attorney, the definition of the rifle of the
prosecutor in the investigation applies equally to those occasions when a state prosecutor is
involved in the investigation. The rules described infra notes 356-59 and accompanying text
should be adopted by the states as part of their ethics provisions and applied to the state
prosecutor as well.
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This article explores the need to amend the current codes of
professional conduct to recognize and define the non-adversarial role
of the federal investigating attorney. New provisions are necessary to
assist the federal attorney in conforming her conduct to ethical stand-
ards and to further the ends of truth-seeking in the investigation and
the administration of justice. The code provisions should reflect this
non-adversarial role and guide the attorney's conduct as a neutral fact
finder. The provisions should include specific limitations on the inves-
tigating attorney, defining the contours of her discretionary powers to
investigate crimes and criminals.
Part I of this article discusses the history of the prosecuting attor-
ney and her distinctive role in the criminal justice system. Part II
discusses the adversarial process and the problems inherent in utilizing
that system in the investigative stage of a criminal case. Part. In explores
the modern rules of professional conduct and their roots in the adver-
sarial process, concluding that many of the rules are inapplicable to
the investigating attorney. Part IV discusses the need for code provi-
sions and rules to guide and restrain the prosecuting attorney in the
investigation of a case and how those provisions should be developed
and adopted. Part IV includes a proposal for a general definition
provision and suggested areas for additional regulation.
Federal prosecutors have been accused in recent years of attempt-
ing to exempt themselves from ethics regulations. 27
 These actions may,
however, be merely an effort to find guidance where none exists. This
article will assist in focusing the debate on the need for additional
specific ethics provisions to provide that guidance for investigating
attorneys.
I. THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS AND THE DIVERSE. ROLES OF THE
FEDERAL PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
The adversarial process of the American criminal justice system
requires that each side of a conflict be represented by a zealous advo-
°Mark Ballard, ABA Notebook, LEGAL Tim Es, Aug. 15, 1994, at 7 (quoting ABA President R.
William Ide, HI, as commenting that the DOI regulations regarding contacting represented
parties were an "unilateral et fcirt to exempt Justice attorneys bum the ABA's Model Ride 4.2");
Leonard H. Becker, Should Prosecutors Be Exempt from the Rules of Prgimional Conduct?, WAsu.
L.Aw., July-Aug. 1995, at 7 (in discussing § 502 or 1995 Crime Bill which delegated ;till ethics
regulation of federal prosecutors to noi, Bar Counsel Becker stated, "[t]0 intriMuce a wholesale
exernptinu based upon the happenstance of employment by the federal government would work
an unprecedented departure from the unifying embrace of the Bar's ethical rules"); John M.
Fitzgibbons, The Tug of War over Ex Parte Contact by Federal Praseculorv, Fran. Lim., June 1995, at
10 ("[T] he Department of Justice has unilaterally declared that its attorneys constitute a unique
and elite breed or lawyers whose conduct in these illStalICCS is unreviewable.").
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cate.28
 In the United States federal courts, the people are represented
by an Assistant United States Attorney. As an advocate for the govern-
ment, the prosecuting attorney plays a distinctive role with roots in
both history and common law. Although the prosecutor is an advocate,
identifying or even defining her client is difficult. While she is an
integral part of the adversary system, she is not only an advocate but
also a "minister of justice." A brief look at the history of prosecution
in America, and the special role played by the prosecutor in the system,
will be helpful in understanding our current system.
A. The History of Prosecution in America
Although the American criminal justice system traces its origin to
English common law, the American prosecutor has no real counterpart
in England.29 In England, the duty of criminal prosecution has never
been vested in one group of attorneys." Rather, attorneys are ap-
pointed to prosecute individual cases. An English attorney may act as
an appointed prosecutor in one case and as a defense attorney in
another case.'"
In England, because of the division of labor within the legal
system, one attorney acts as counsel or solicitor until the case arrives
at trial. The case is then given to a barrister who acts as the litigator. 32
The solicitor's job, however, does not encompass the pre-charging
investigation." The investigation is the sole responsibility of the po-
28 See infra text accompanying notes 129-32.
25 Some commentators have noted with cynicism that the American prosecutor of today may
resemble the earlier British prosecutor. In medieval England, justice was believed to follow from
the Monarch, who prosecuted crime to keep order. Joseph Lawless notes that "IM]any prosecutors
believe their duty is to keep the 'King's peace' rather than 'do justice,' to be the zealous avenging
angel of society rather that the vigilant guardian of the rights of both the innocent and the guilty."
LAWLESS, supra note 4, at 4.
'') The Director of Public Prosecutions acts as a solicitor for the Crown, but the trial work is
still distributed to independent barristers. MICHAEL. MCCONVILLE: ET AL., THE CASE FOR Ttu:
PRosEcuTioN: POLICE SUSPECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CRIMINALITY 5 (1993),
31 PATRICK DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL. PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 21 (1960) (Lord Devlin nig-
gems that because barristers are not professional prosecutors, they are not "prosecution-minded").
32 A result of this division is that the solicitor has more direct contact with the individuals
involved in the case, while the barrister is merely "briefed as to the matter prior to the trial and
has far less contact with the individuals involved in the case." See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 7.
This division of labor has been cited as the source of great efficiency in the British system. See
1..AwLEss, supra note 4, at 6. Part of the American prosecutor's duty, however, is to serve the victim
of the crime which requires more than just a briefing and a quick trip to the courthouse. See
generally ROBERT ELIAS, .1 .11E POLITICS OF VICTIMIZATION: VICTIMS, VICTIMOLOGY, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1986); Karen L. Kennard, The Victim's Veto: A Way to Increase Victim Impact in Criminal
Case Dispositions, 77 CAL. L. REV. 417 (1989).
ss Police arc very powerful within England's criminal justice system. They make critical
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lice.'" The policeman is viewed as a litigant represented by the attorney
appointed to his case." In essence, British criminal prosecution is a
system of private prosecution. 36
The American criminal justice system is predominately a system
of public prosecution." Early in American history, the responsibility
for the prosecution of criminal offenses was assigned to a designated
group of professional prosecuting attorneys, whose full-time job was to
prosecute criminal offenses. By 1665, Philadelphia had appointed a
prosecuting attorney to handle the prosecution of all criminal of-
fenses.'8 In 1704 and 1711, Connecticut and Virginia, respectively, had
provided for the use of public prosecutors."
The British system of solicitor/barrister also did not make it to the
new world. The class system of lawyering did not translate well for
colonists attempting to escape the tyranny of a caste system. The
American prosecutor has always been a "jack of all trades," handling
the investigation, charging, pretrial proceedings and trial. Finally, un-
like the British attorney, the contemporary American prosecutor is
intimately involved in the investigation of many crimes. 4"
decisions about charging and continuing prosecution. Mtci IAF,L MCCONVILLE & jOIIN BALDW/N,
COURTS, PROSECUTION AND CONVICTION 96-97 (1981).
34 DAVID M. NISSMAN & En HAGEN, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 4 (1982). Wolfram suggests
that this division of labor in the British system might be conducive to allowing the prosecutor to
reexamine the prosecution throughout the proceedings. The American system, however, makes
it ahnost impossible because filing the charges requires the prosecutor to form the opinion that
the individual should be prosecuted. Wormckm, supra note 2, at 766.
"Justice Devlin characterized the policeman's role in the English system as "like any other
litigant, and to a large extent in the hands of his counsel." LAWLESS, supra note 4, at 5.
36 LAWLESS, supra note 4, at 3-7; see also jAcoBy , supra note 24, at 1-39. The system can be
called "private prosecution" because the attorneys who represent the prosecution are not part of
a select group that only prosecutes. LAWLESS, swim note 4, at 3-7; see aisojAconv, supra note 24,
at 1-39. England did not have private prosecution from the standpoint that individual victims
would pursue prosecution through privately retained counsel. LAWLESS, supra note 4, at 3-7; see
also JAcony , supra note 24, at 1-39. The office of Director of Public Prosecution was created in
Crest Britain in 1879. LAWLESS, .supra note 4, at 3-7; see also JACORY, supra note 24, at 1-39. The
office is in charge of appointed attorneys to prosecute individual cases. LAWI.Ess, supra note 4,
at 3-7; see a/so JAconv, supra note 24, at 1-39. For a more detailed look at the differences between
the English system of prosecution and the American system of prosecution, see LAWLESS, supra
note 4, at 3-7; see also incony , supra note 24, at 1-39,
Some jurisdictions, however, maintain the common law institution of the private prosecu-
tor, a lawyer who is hired by is victim to assist in a criminal prosecution. See generally John D.
Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors; 47 ARK, L. Rix. 511
(1994); Joan Meier, The "Right" to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking Public
and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85 (1992).
38 NissmAN & HAGEN, .soars note 34, at 4,
59JAconv, supra note 24, at 14.
40 See infra text accompanying notes 78-87.
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Some commentators believe the origin of the American prosecut-
ing attorney is not England at all but, rather, an adaptation of the
continental European inquisitorial system.'" The prosecutor's prede-
cessor was the jud d'instruction, an appointed official or assistant judge
whose role included that of police officer and judge. The duty of the
assistant judge was to uncover all evidence that pointed to the commis-
sion of a crime and to identify the perpetrator.42
 The thrust of the
position was that the appointed official represented the community's
interests, not the interest of any one individual. This characterization
is the nucleus of the role of the American prosecutor, as echoed in
Justice Sutherland's classic definition:
The U.S. Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done.•'
In 1789, Congress inaugurated the federal system, establishing the
office of United States Attorney and, accordingly, federal prosecuting
authority.'" Each federal district has one United States Attorney who is
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and can only be dismissed by the President. The United States Attor-
ney, through appointed Assistant United States Attorneys, represents
the federal government in the federal courts and prosecutes all federal
crimes.''`' The role played by the representative of the United States in
a criminal case is not the mirror image of the role played by the
defendant's attorney.
B. The Prosecuting Attorney's Unique Role as an Advocate
The prosecuting attorney's role differs from that of private coun-
sel in significant ways. As one commentator stated, "[T]he legal pro-
fession's basic narrative . . pictures the lawyer as a partisan agent
acting with the sanction of the constitution to defend a private party
against the government."'" This description correctly focuses on the
11 II is interesting to note that the founding fathers rejected all other parts oldie inquisitorial
system. LEWIS KATZ, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME: PRETRIAL. DELAY IN FELONY CASES 16 (1972).
.42 Id .
13
 Berger v. United Slates, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
EINENNTEIN, supra site 15, at 9-10.
15 1d.
16 Geoffrey Hazard, lr., The Future of Legal Ethicz, 100 VALE	 1239, 1244 (1991).
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role of the defense attorney as an advocate for his client. However, the
definition by its terms excludes the government's attorney, who does
not represent a single client and whose job is defined as being at least
in part non-partisan.
1. An Advocate Without a Singular Client
When one thinks about an attorney, one naturally pictures a law-
yer representing an individual client with individual interests.° The
prosecuting attorney is hard-pressed to name any one client or even
one interest that she represents.'s Instead, the prosecutor represents
groups of constituencies. 4° Consider the constituencies that the prose-
cutor must appease: the crime victims, law enforcement agencies, the
prosecutor's office's policies and the elusive concepts of "truth" and
"justice." Each plays a vital role in the prosecutor's exercise of discretion.'"
Although the prosecutor does not represent the victim, the vic-
tim's desires are considered as part: of the prosecutor's decision making
processf° The weight given those desires is influenced by a variety of
different factors. 52 The victim's involvement in the criminal process has
47 The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct discourage representation of clients with
conflicting interests. See, e.g., Mohr. RULES or PRovessioNIAL Cosinttur Rule 1.7 (1994) ("A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client; and (2) each client consents after consultation.").
48 As justice Sutherland stated, "The U.S. Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy." Berger, 295 U.S. at 88; see also Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Stock Buyers
Inc., 760 F.2(1 698, 705 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The public prosecutor cannot take as a guide for the
conduct of this office the Stalulards plan attorney appearing on behalf ()Tan individual client."),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987).
WoLERAm, supra note 2, at 759.
5° See Drew S. Days, Ill, In Search of the Solicitor General's Clients: A Drama with Many
Characters, 83 Ky. I.J. 485, 489 (1994) (discussing Solicitor General's clients in terms of variety
of relationships).
Several articles and books have been written about the victim's struggle to be part of the
system. See, e.g., GEORGE I'. FLEXCIIEIt, WITH JUSTICE FOR Some: Vtc'rtMs' RIGIITS IN CRIMINAL.
TliIALS (1995); Donald J. Flail, Victims' Voices in Criminal Court: Need Jew Restraint, 28 Am. GUM.
I... Rev. 233 (1991); David L. Roland, Progress in the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer the
"Forgotten. Victim", 17 Pepe. L. Ruts'. 35 (1989); Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea
Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (1987).
Of course, not all crimes have victims. Many crimes within the federal system arc regulatory
crimes or crimes against the government.. Kathleen E. [hickey, Crime Control and the Commerce
Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 801, 803 (1996). The most obvious of these
crimes are the drug crimes, which are so often the locus of federal prosecution. Rory K. Little,
Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors!, 65 Fottounm I... Rev. 355, 364 (1996), In
these crimes, there is no "victim" as it is commonly defined.
52 See, e.g., Donald J. Hall, The Role of the Victim in the Prosecution and Disposition of a Criminal
Case, 28 VAN D. L. Rev. 938, 948 (1975) (hit:ions that affect weight given to victim's desires include
sufficiency of evidence, seriousness of offense and attitude of individual prosecutor); Elizabeth
A. Stanko, The Impact of Victim Assessment on Pmsecutor:s Screening Decisions: The Case of the New
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increased in recent years, 53 but the victim still does not have the status
or influence exercised by an individual client."
Another possible client for the prosecution is the law enforcement
officer who initiated the case. In many cases there are no identifiable
victims and all the witnesses are law enforcement personnel. In all
federal cases, at least one law enforcement agency is involved. 68 Neither
the Department of Justice ("DOJ") nor the individual United States
Attorney's office pursues offenses without the aid, and most times
initiation, of a law enforcement agency. 56
Even though the interests of law enforcement are of paramount
importance, the prosecutor is not an advocate for law enforcement
agencies. 57
 The courts have declared that the prosecutor does not and
should not consider law enforcement a client. 58 Although much time
is spent advising agents on obtaining credible and convincing admis-
sible evidence, the confidentiality and loyalty rules associated with a
lawyer/client relationship do not apply to the prosecutor/law enforce-
ment relationship.'`' An attorney who determines that a law enforce-
ment official has committed a crime is obligated to reveal the informa-
tion and prosecute the offender. 6°Additionally, the information obtained
by law enforcement is not confidential, and a prosecutor must disclose
to the defendant any information that is helpful on the issue of the
defendant's innocence.°
York County District Attorney's Office, 16 L. & Soc'v REV. 221 (1981-1982) (discussing effect of
victim's believability on prosecutor's charging decisions).
33 Kirk Johnson, Grime Victims Getting a Day, and a Say, in Court, N.Y. PINES, Apr. 1, 1988,
at B7 (citing Anne Seytnore, spokeswoman for Sunny VonBulow National Victim Center, who
said, "Men years ago there weren't victims, just witnesses, whose only role was to come forward
and say what happened to them so that the state could find justice.").
34 Id. Charles M. Oberly, Delaware's Attorney General, said "[Y]ou don't give the victim the
right to say 'This is how the case will be handled, this is how it will be done.' The system just
doesn't work that way." Id.
33
 For an extensive description of the relationship between assistant United States attorneys
and law enforcement officials, see EISENSTEIN, supra note 15, at ch. 8.
56 The United States Manual delegates which investigating agency will investigate certain
crimes. U.S. DEP'T oF JuvricE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL §§ 9-61.620 (1994).
37 One need only consider the issue of confidentiality to see that law enforcement agencies
could not be the client. See, generally Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the Government [Auger, 57
N.C. L. REV. 625 (1979).
58 See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 395 (1987) (prosecutor represents
public, not police); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 485 (1991) (where court denied
prosecutor absolute immunity for giving advice to police).
59
 Lawry, supra note 57.
6° 1(1,
63 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (holding that prosecutor's failure to
disclose impeachment evidence violates due process); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 114
(1970) (holding that due process violation did not occur when prosecutor failed to turn over
evidence favorable to defense in absence of specific request); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
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In some respects, the prosecuting attorney is not only the advocate
but also the client."' In pursuing the goals of a criminal case, the
prosecuting attorney need not consult with any private individual. As
one commentator noted, the only mind the prosecutor must make up
is his own.° The prosecutors's discretion is unique because in many
areas it is unfettered. In contrast, the defense counsel is controlled in
many respects by the individual desires of his client. 64 The lack of a
clearly defined client and the need to consider several contrasting
interests distinguishes the prosecutor from other attorneys who, as
Lord Brougham said, "know no other, except his client."'
2. An Advocate Without a Singular Purpose
In addition to the lack of a discernible client, the prosecutor also
has a distinct mission. Unlike the defense attorney," the prosecutor
does not merely seek to defeat his adversary.° She must strive to seek
justice and fairness."8 The prosecutor is required to protect his own
case and, in some situations, the opponent's case as well."'
(1963) (holding that suppression of favorable evidence by prosecution after specific request by
defense violates due process).
11`People v. Kelly, 142 Cal. Rptr. 457, 458 (Ct. App. 1978) (court observed that in practical
effect, public prosecutor functions in dual capacity as both agent and principal, as both attorney
and client); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 393 (ad
ed. 1992); William Edwards, Professional Responsibility of the Federal Prosecutor, 17 U. Rieit, L. REV.
511, 513 (1983) (discussing that prosecutors make decisions that client usually makes).
" See GILLERs, supra note 52.
6s The Model Rules of Professional Conduct define the requirements of an attorney in consult-
ing with, and abiding by, the wishes of the client. Mom, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNoticr Rule
1.2 (1994). The Rules state in relevant part:
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of repre-
sentation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and shall consult with the client
as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case,
the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as
to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
Id.
10 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN Commit,: 8 (I. Nightingale ed., 1821), quoted in Charles Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer
-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 n.1
(1975); WouRnm, supra note 2, at 759 n.8; Lawry, supra note 57, at 628,
Si1 For an interesting contrast of' views regarding the duty of the defendant to seek justice,
see David Luhan, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 WItc.n. L. Rai/. 1729 (1993); William H.
Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 Micit. L. Rim 1703 (1993).
G7 See ABA joint Conference of Professional Responsibility, Professional Responsibility: Report
of the, joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. j. 1159, 1218 (1958) (describing dual role of prosecuting attorney
to "fUrnish that adversary element essential to the intimmed decision" and to seek "impartial justice").
68 Thc ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct require the prosecutor to act as a "minister
of justice." Rule 5.8 clot (1983). The Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that the
prosecutor should "seek justice." EC 7-19 (1980).
05 See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors
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The dual role of the prosecutor produces a quasi-judicial office
rather than that of a partisan advocate." As one court noted, "In a
criminal case, the government must wear two hats. The prosecutor
must act as an advocate, although he or she is repeatedly cautioned to
put ahead of partisan success the observance of the law."" Yet, the
prosecutor is still called upon to participate in an adversarial process
and to face the dilemmas and contravening issues of these inconsistent
cluties. 72
Our criminal system has been called a "modified" adversarial
system because of the dual role played by the prosecutor." After indict-
ment, when an adversary relationship is defined and properly in place,
the appropriate role for the prosecutor is as "modified" advocate—
modified because she is simultaneously both a zealous advocate and a
minister of justice. 74
 In the investigation stage, however, the prosecutor
should play a singularly non-adversarial role, that of a non-partisan fact
finder. During the investigation, the prosecutor is exclusively a minister
of justice.
C. The Investigating Prosecutor's Role as a Fact Finder
The investigating attorney is not a member of the adversary proc-
ess and should perform a radically different role. During the investi-
gation, where the elements of the adversary system and its safeguards
are not yet defined, the prosecutor must fulfill a quasi-judicial role."
The role of the investigating attorney is not that of an advocate but
that of a neutral fact finder.
Before a grand jury is convened, an indictment is signed or a
defendant is arrested, the prosecuting attorney may have spent hun-
dreds of hours on the case. With the increase in white collar crime,
organized crime and public corruption, prosecutors are becoming
involved in cases at earlier stages." Historically, investigations were
Do Justice?, 44 'AND. L. RF:v. 45, 66-74 (1991) (discussing prosecutor's responsibility to "do
justice" when opposing counsel is ineffective:).
7U WMFRAM11, supra note 2, at 759 n.8.
71 Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1352 (8th Cir. 1990).
72 Compare Robert Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L. REV.
647, 656 (1986) (arguing that at trial, prosecutor should present "strongest argument" for
conviction) with H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethic Standard:
Guidance from the ABA, 71 M ICE I. L. REv. 1145, 1159 (1973) (urging that prosecutors act primarily
as zealous advocates),
73 See sufnu note 72.
7-1
	 generally Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framervoik,
15 Am. j, CR151. L. 197 (1988).
75 See id.
75 Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime: How
September 19961	 A CODE 10!? FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 	 935
conducted by law enforcement agencies and the prosecutor became
involved only when the time came to charge the defendant and begin
formal criminal proceedings. 77
 Today, the use of complicated investi-
gative techniques and the investigation of complex crimes cause law
enforcement agencies to require assistance from the prosecutor in the
early stages of an investigation. 78
The use of an undercover investigation to obtain evidence of
criminals and crimes is nothing new. 7" During the past two decades,
however, the complexity of the undercover investigations in the federal
system has increased enormously." Undercover operations often in-
volve infiltration through the creation of elaborate schemes.st The
prosecutor has been called upon to assist in complicated undercover
operations to assure the legality of the investigation by advising law
enforcement agencies on the constitutionality of their proposed ac-
tions and on the proper methods of obtaining evidence." Congress has
explicitly given federal prosecutors control over particular investigative
techniques, such as eavesdropping applications."
Far Will Ihe Courts Allow Proserutors to Go?, 54 U. NTT. L. Raw. 405, 409 (1993); Norton„ supra
note 13, at 301,
77 Norton, ,supra note 13, at 301; see also Henning, supra note 76, at 406 (observing that
differences between traditional street crime investigation and investigation of white collar crime
arc reflected in roles played by prosecutor and investigator). For all extensive look at the
investigative process, See HARRY I. Sums: rr Al.., CRIMINAL PRACTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
(1992).
78 Karim, ,supra note 12, at 700.
79 See William GellCg1), The New Adversary, 54 BkooK, L REv. 781, 787 (noting that in
mid-I 970s, federal prosecutors began directing resources to areas of while collar crime). See
generally G. ROBERT BLAKELY Er Al.., NATIONAL INS l'. OE JUSTICE, RACKETS BUREAUS: INVESTIGA-
TION AND PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME, at xiii-xiv (1978).
811 Cershmo17, supra note 20, at 396.
8 ' Id. Fur example, the "Abscam" operation which investigated legislative corniptitm involved
the creation of a fictitious Middle Eastern corporation and used undercover agents posing as
representatives of wealthy Arab sheiks. Id.; see also United States 'A Kelly, 707 F.2(11460 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983). The "Courtroom" investigation in Miami, Florida, involved the
creation of staged cases to uncover jtidicial corruption; in United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518,
1529 (7th CAI. 1985), the Seventh Circuit noted that the staging of cases was part or a "nasty hue
necessary business." Flir additional examples of complex undercover investigations, see STEwmcr,
supra note 19.
82 Floyd I. Clarke, Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, noted t ha t in the
area of public corruption cases, the investigation requires "contact with the prosecutor as smut
as practical." Letter from Clarke to William Webb, Assistant Attorney General (Aug, 4, 1987),
reprinted in U.S. DE•'r OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTION of PUBLIC CORRUPTIONS CASES A-3 (1988).
"A federal wiretap application requires a prosecutor's authorization and supervision. See
Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2520 (1988).
The courts For decades have recognized the importance and dangers of this investigative
tool, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967) ("Few threats to liberty exist which are greater
than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices."). The Supreme Court has attempted
regulate it through constitutional safeguards. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
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In addition to the complicated undercover investigation, the fed-
eral attorney participates in the investigation of complex crimes involv-
ing the use of subpoenas of business records and the use of the grand
jury. 84
 One commentator called the grand jury "one of the most pow-
erful instruments in the arsenal of the prosecutor."" The prosecutor
is involved in the issuance of subpoenas and directing grand jury
proceedings." The use of the grand jury in an investigation of a
complex white collar crime to produce documentary evidence is indis-
pensable.87
While some authors have suggested that prosecutors should not
be involved in the investigation," the courts have recognized the im-
portance of the involvement of the prosecutor in the investigative
(1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928) (Brandeis, j., dissenting). Berger v. New York set forth constitutional safeguards requiring:
1. A showing of probable cause to believe that a particular offense has been
committed;
2. A description of the conversations to be intercepted;
3. A specific and limited time period for the surveillance;
4. A request to renew the warrant based on a showing of continued probable cause;
5. Termination of the wiretap once the evidence has been seized;
6. Notice to the subject of the eavesdropping, unless a factual showing of exigency
has been made; and
7. A return of the warrant so that the court can supervise and restrict the use of'
the seized evidence.
388 U.S. at 54-60.
Karlan, supra note 12, at 700.
85 BENNETT L. GE:RSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 2.2 (1995). A criticism or justifica-
tion of the grand jury process or its use by the prosecutor is beyond the scope of this article. See
generally Peter Amelia, Reforming the Federal Grand fury and the State Preliminary Hearing to
Prevent Convictions Without Adjudications, 78 Micri. L. REV, 463 (1980); Andrew D. Leipold, Why
Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CottNELL L. Itr.v. 260 (1995); Jon Van
Dyke, The Grand Jury: Representative or Elite?, 28 fins -riNGs U. 37 (1976).
88 Leipold, supra note 85, at 315.
87 Genego, supra note 79, at 792; Leipold, supra note 85, at 315. The modern grand jury has
two related functions. Some have described the grand jury as being a shield and a sword. The
indicting grand jury functions as a screening device to "shield" citizens from unwarranted
charges. SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY PRACTICE: § 1:07, at 35 (1986). The
investigating grand jury acts as a "sword" to discover and eliminate criminal conduct. Id.
In the federal system, the Fifth Amendment requires Mai every person accused of a felony
be indicted by the grand jury. U.S. CoNs .r. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states in part: "No
person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a grand jury." Id. The Supreme Court has held that this provision does not apply
to the states. See 1-lurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884). For a summary of states' grand
jury indictment requirements, see BEALE & BRYSON, supra, § 2:03, at 16-18.
88 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER 395 (2d
ed. 1996) (indicating that as general matter, prosecutors should not be involved in police
investigations because of risk or becoming witness). I was present at the June 23, 1995, meeting
of the Florida Bar's Professional Ethics Committee when an attorney commented that he believed
that the involvement of an attorney in the investigation of a criminal case "degraded the profession."
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stage. In United States v. Guerrerio, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York observed that during the investiga-
tion, the prosecutor is in a better position to protect the potential
criminal defendant's rights." The court attributed this protection to
the prosecuting attorney's obligation to see that justice is done."' The
court noted that the exclusion of the attorney from the investigation
may "promote rather than inhibit" inappropriate investigative tactics."'
Without attorney involvement, investigative decisions would be left
solely to law enforcement personnel who are subject only to legal, not
ethical, constraints. It. is the prosecutor's responsibility to be a non-par-
tisan, non-advocate when she is determining whether an offense oc-
curred. As Justice Robert Jackson said, "[A] citizen's safety lies in the
prosecutor who . . . seeks truth and not victims." 92 It is at this stage that
the attorney's neutral exercise of discretion is paramount.
The investigating attorney must act as a judge and fact finder in
deciding how to proceed during an investigation. The prosecutor must
interpret the law and attempt to apply it to law enforcement's proposed
investigative actions. She must determine whether the proposed tech-
niques are lawful and if they will lead to admissible evidence.'° In
addition, she must assist in the protection of citizens' rights. As a
minister of justice, the investigating attorney's goals must not be merely
to seek evidence but also to protect the rights of others in the process.
The prosecutor must also exercise discretion in deciding what
charges to investigate." Professor Uviller emphasizes that this is "one
of the more significant exercises of discretion in the prosecution's
arsenal.""5 The prosecution assists in deciding where limited resources
should be spent." Part of that determination is whether to pursue
investigations of specific crimes or investigations of specific criminals."'
89 675 F. Stipp. 1430, 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
90 Id.
1) 1 Id.
92 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the Second Annual Conference of
United States Attorneys, (Apr. 1, 1940), in NATIONAL COLLEGE or DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, I mint,
CONSIDERATIONS EN PROSECUTION: ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PROSECUTOR 2 &lull Doglass
ed., 1977).
" Zacharias, supra note 69, at 50 n.19, Professor Zacharias identifies part of the pre-trial
prosecutor's job as predicting "the appropriate result." Id.
94
 Even in the federal prosecutor's office there are many cases in which the prosecutor is not
involved in the investigation of the case. Norton, ,supra note 13, at 301.
Uviller, supra note 72, at 1151.
94 Id. at 1147. See also Jackson, supra note 92, at 3 {Justice Jackson noted that "[0] ne of the
greatest difficulties of the position of prosecutor is that he must pick his cases, because no
prosecutor can even investigate all of the cases in which he receives complaints"),
97 Compare Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility If the Proseenting Attorney,
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A prosecutor must exercise this discretion with a non-partisan assess-
ment of the public's concerns. 98
Finally, the prosecutor must be a fact finder. The prosecutor seeks
the truth in order to assess appropriate actions. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct indicate that a prosecutor should never file a case
unless probable cause exists.•• However, the standard for filing charges
is actually higher than just probable cause."' The National Prosecution
Standards developed by the National Association of District Attorneys
state that "the prosecutor should file only those charges which she
reasonably believes can be substantiated by admissible evidence at
trial."'"' Some prosecutors believe that in addition to the presence of
sufficient evidence, the prosecutor should have an abiding conviction
that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged. 1 U2 The ABA Stand-
ards of Criminal justice provide that the prosecutor should consider his
or her beliefs as to the guilt of the suspect in the charging decision.'"
Just as a trial attempts to reconstruct past events, 1 °4 a prosecutor during
an investigation must reconstruct past events to determine who should
be charged.'" In this capacity, the investigating prosecutor seeks to
ascertain the truth and acts as judge, not advocate.
As a non-adversarial fact finder, the attorney must scrupulously
avoid a presumption favoring a certain result."' The attorney must
confront factual uncertainty with inquiry, not with a "working assump-
tion of guilt."167 She must continually assess what facts have been learned
55 CAA). L.J. 1030, 1034 (1967) (asserting that targeting individuals is unethical) with Uviller,
.supra note 72, at 1151 (suggesting that target can be either crime or criminal and that issue
should he motivation of prosecutor).
" See Jackson, supra note 92. Justice Jackson articulated the danger that the prosecutor "will
pick people that he thinks he can get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted." Id. He
urged prosecutors to select cases in 'which the offense is the most flagrant, the public harm the
greatest, and the proof the most certain." Id.
99 Rule 3.8(a) (1994).
H"NATIoNnt, list. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, 43.3 (2d ed.
1991).
151
1112 /61. § 43.6 ("prosecutor should exercise his discretion to file only those charges which he
considers to be consistent with the interest of justice").
1031.11E PROSECUTION FUNCTION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTicE 3-3.9(h) (1) (1995);
see STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS
540 (1996).
"'I See STEVEN LURET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 1 (1993).
"Justice Frankel suggested that "the objective ought to be as close an approxhnation as we
might hind to seeking the facts about crimes while attempting to be civilized in our treatment of
criminals." FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 98.
"'Fisher, supra note 74, at 230.
In7 Albert Alschuler, hoseculor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI, L. Rs:v. 50, 64 n.42 (1968).
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and confront all doubts of credibility." Finally, the neutral fact finder
must make conclusions based on independent judgments of the facts.
All of these responsibilities require the prosecutor to step out of the
role of advocate and into the role of a "minister of justice."
II. THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS AND THE NON-ADVERSARIAL
INVESTIGATION OF A CRIMINAL CASE
The adversarial process is as much a part of the American heritage
as capitalism or sporting competitions."' Yet, the Constitution does not
specifically mention the existence or creation of the adversary sys-
tem."° While the Constitution provides for due process of law in the
Fourteenth Amendment, it does not mandate that due process be
afforded within an adversarial system)" Nevertheless, American courts
recognize the significant part the adversarial process plays in our crimi-
nal justice system." 2 Perhaps the adversary process is, as one commen-
tator noted, "so basic that the Constitution does not even mention it." 113
While the adversarial process may have an important role in the
adjudication of guilt, it has no place in the pre-indictment investiga-
tion, where the goal must be to determine the facts. The adversarial
process should not begin until after the investigation is complete and
a defendant is accused)" Prior to charging, the basic elements of the
adversary process are simply not present, because there are no adver-
saries yet identified. In addition, if the adversarial process was initiated
prior to charging, the prosecutor would he prevented from "weeding out"
those cases that do not warrant continued investigation or prosecution.tt 5
I " See Fisher, supra note 74.
ID"-The existence of such a system of dispute rest.dution reflects a society Mat, in all aspects
Of its public intercourse, adheres to the idea that "competition among individuals produces the
maximum collective good." Robert Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice a Law, in THE
Cool). LAWYER 1.74 (David Lubapi ed., 1983). This process of dispute resolution reflects the value
America places on competition between individual citizens, whether it be in the marketplace, on
the playing field, or in the courthouse. Id. In contrast, see JAMES KAPLAN, GRImINAL JUSTICE:
INTRoDUCTORY CASES AND MATERIAL.; 264-65 (1973) ("In a Socialist state, there is no division
of ditty between the judge, prosecutor and defense counsel ... the defense must assist the
prosecution to find the objective truth in a case." (citing a Bulgarian attorney)).
l' ) David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE Coop LAWYER 98 (David laiban ed.,
1983),
I" Id.
Il 2 See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853,858 (1975) (stating that "closing argument for the
defense is a basic element of the adversary fact finding process in a criminal trial"); Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 652 (1972) (discussing beginning of adversary process in criminal case).
113
 Luban „rapt?, note 110.
114 United States v. Guerrerio, 675 E Stipp. 1430,1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
115 lit fiscal year 1994, federal prosecutors declined 42,870 cases litr a number of different
940	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 tVol. 37:923
The adversarial process is not an effective truth seeking device because
it prioritizes truth very low. 116 During the investigation, all law enforce-
ment personnel—both investigators and attorneys—must conduct a
"search for the truth." Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that
in balancing the justifications for the adversary process against the
need for effective law enforcement, the adversarial process does not,
and should not, begin in the investigative stage of the case.
A. The Elements of the Adversarial Process
The adversarial process requires three entities. The system as-
sumes that there are conflicting parties who believe in the rightness of
their position. Each perspective is represented by a zealous advocate.
Finally, the ultimate decision as to which party prevails is left to an
impartial tribunal. In a criminal case, none of these entities are defined
until after the investigation is complete.
I. Adverse Sides
The first basic premise of the adversary system is that at least two
parties have a dispute upon which they cannot agree. 117 The assump-
tion is that each party believes its perception of the facts to be correct,
and they are unable to reconcile their positions. This premise requires
individuals to "choose sides," to take a position in order for the adver-
sary process to function. The parties in the adversary system initiate
and control the definition of the dispute." 8 In a criminal prosecution,
the government initiates the dispute by filing a charging document on
behalf of the people. 11 "
At the beginning of an investigation, the individuals being prose-
cuted are not always defined. 120 The prosecutor is not in a position to
reasons, including a finding that no federal offense had been committed. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
STATISTICAL REPORTS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 1994, at 70-71 (1995).
See HALL, supra note 88, at 189 (suggesting that all search and arrest warrant affidavits should
be approved by prosecution to allow eliminating cases which do not warrant changing).
I l'As Judge Frankel noted, the adversary process "rates truth too low." Marvin E. Frankel,
77w Search for Truth: An Imperial View, 123 U. N. L. REV, 1031, 1032 (1975).
117 Murray Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil 'Woo-de, in Tin: Goon LAWYER 150, 153 (David
Luban ed., 1983).
118 See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358 (1972) (noting that in adversary process,
each side is responsible for presenting favorable evidence).
119 See infra text accompanying notes 147-40.
1 " United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (court noted that in
investigative stage of the case, subject matter of representation is obscure), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
989 (1974).
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advocate any side because the government has not "committed itself
to prosecute." 12 ' To "choose sides" before the completion of the inves-
tigation is premature and negatively impacts both the government and
the innocent defendant who is prematurely targeted.
2. Zealous Advocates
The second premise is an extension of the first. In believing in
the rightness of its position, each party is ultimately responsible for
presenting his or her case. The responsibility is to zealously present
one side of the dispute—not an even-handed presentation of the facts.
The opponent is responsible for zealously presenting its side. Each
party, either alone or through legal representation, seeks to "put his
best foot forward." 122
 The entire process anticipates the contentious
presentation of evidence from beginning to end. 123 The rules of the
process call for reciprocation, not cooperation. As Robert Kutak ex-
plained, "a fundamental premise of the adversary system of jurispru-
dence is that a competitive rather than cooperative presentation and
analysis of the facts underlying a dispute will produce a greater number
of correct results." 124
 At the center of this competitive model of dispute
resolution is the assumption that neither side is responsible for the
competence of the other.' 25
In most criminal cases, the defendant is represented by a lawyer.' 26
Usually, interested third parties do not participate directly, except as
witnesses.' 27
 In putting forth his best case, the advocate will zealously
present his position. At its very core, the adversary system requires
one-sided loyalty.' 28
 The adversary system presupposes that each side
bears the obligation not only to present evidence supporting its case,
but also to ferret out all evidence that supports his case and contradicts
the opponent's case. 129
121 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 682.
122 schw„rtz, supra note 117.
128 WOLFRAM. supra note 2, at 564.
Kutak, supra note 109, at 174.
125 Id.
126
 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, H34 ( 1975) (right to self-representation has been deeply
rooted in our system from foundation of (air federal law).
127
 WOLFRAM, SUpra note 2, at 564. One is reminded of the saying, labt attorney who
represents himself has a fool for a client." Id,
128
 See infra text accompanying notes 251-53.
129 liruce A. Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System, 24 QUM, L. But.t.. 126,
130 (1988).
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3. Neutral Decision Maker
Finally, the adversary process assumes that both sides will present
their case to a neutral, passive tribunal.'" In most American criminal
cases, the impartial tribunal is made up of lay jurors.' 31 The assumption
is that the fact. finder, whether it he judge or jury, is neutral." 2 The fact.
fincler begins the process without demonstrable bias"' or knowledge
of the facts."' Although the judge may have some knowledge of a case
from pretrial motions, any independent knowledge of the facts would
usually disqualify him.' 35
In order to insure impartiality, the tribunal has no responsibility
to investigate or present any evidence. The parties explore the issues.""
The fact finder takes no initiative to define the issues in the case, to
elicit any evidence or to investigate any uncharted avenues of de-
fense."' The fact finder is required to make its decision solely on the
evidence chosen and presented by the parties.' 38
During the investigation process, neither the adversaries nor the
passive tribunal is present.'" Therefore, the prosecutor usually takes
on the role of attempting to judge the facts and law to determine
whether charges should be filed. The prosecutor must not be prema-
turely forced to advocate a side and become embroiled in an adversar-
ial process prior to the completion of the investigation."'
134i Zacharias, supra note 69, at 85.
131
 GRANO, SUPra note 11, at 6.
132 WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 566.
I" Mom, Gout•. o• . junimm, CONDUCT Canon 3(G) (1)(a) (1990) (requiring rccusal because
of personal bias); id, at Canon 3(D) (must disclose bias to advocate and obtain consent to
continue); see also Roberta K. Flowers, Does it Cog ma Much? A Differetwe' Look al J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 64 FORM tAlkl L. Rix. 491, 534-35 (1995) (concluding that advocates can attempt to
eliminate prejudice but not perspective of jurors),
134 Commonwealth v. Stewart, 295 A.2d 303, 307 (Pa. 1972) (Roberts,,[., concurring) (prose-
cutor required to disclose juror's relationship to victim), But see VALERIE P. HANS & NIEI VI DMA R,
JIJDC:ING THE JuRv 23-24 (1986) (stating that early jurors were required to know either parties
or facts to qualify for jury service).
135 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONnUCI' Canon 2(B) (1990) (prohibiting judges from allowing
relationships to itillnence judicial conduct). .
13fi WOLFRAM, sn/na note 2, at 564.
137 See also Paterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 4432 (1907) ("The
theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by
evidence and argument in open court.")
1 '8 Zacharias, .suptu note 69, at 61.
13"See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing role of the grand jury in
investigation).
110 See Luban, supra note 66, at 1744 (discussing effect of defense attorney's actions as
"exerting enormous gravitational force" hardening the. prosecutor's position),
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The Adversarial System's Effect on Neutral Fact Finding
Imposing the adversarial process on the investigative stage of the
case hinders neutral fact finding in two ways. First, it leads the prose-
cutor as a partisan adversary to charge or prosecute regardless of
whether the crime or criminal warrants prosecution. Second, it hinders
the obtaining of the necessary information to identify the crimes or
the criminals. In other words, the "search for the truth" is thwarted
before it begins.
I. The Creation of Advocates
The adversary process demands that each attorney take the posi-
tion of zealous advocate. Placing the government attorney prematurely
into that position negatively impacts their ability to seek the truth. The
investigating attorney should not act as an advocate, but rather as a
screening device whose task is to eliminate poor cases as well as to
facilitate the making of strong cases."' As Jo Ann Harris observed
about her job as a prosecutor:
[tidy client has always been served when I do the right thing
even if it means dismissing or losing a case. Indeed, one of
the major satisfactions of the various roles I have played in
the Department of Justice has come from the responsibility
to use this power in the public up to its very limits, and no
further, to exercise it in decisions not to prosecute as firmly
as in decisions to indict.' 42
The prosecutor has a duty not to bring a case which is not supported
by sufficient evidence."" If the prosecutor prematurely advocates a
position, then she shirks her responsibility and does the case and
the public a disservice. Throughout the process the prosecutor is a
"modified" advocate.''''' In the investigative stage, the prosecutor
should not be an advocate,
141 See William H. Simon, Further Reflections on Libertarian Criminal Defense, 91 Mimi. L. R,.v.
1767,1768 (1993) (recogniling that there is no comparable screening role for defense counsel).
142 coTE1VAIAT, Supra note l9, at 37.
143
 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONIIUCT Rule 3.8(a) (1983) (prohibiting prosecutor
from pursuing charge which is not supported by probable rause).
I " United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,258 (1967) (White, J., dissenting) (discussing defense
attorney's role in the "modified" adversary system); Tyson v. Stale, 619 N.E.2d 276 (lnd. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1216 (1994); State ex rel. W.C., 426 A.2d 50 (NJ. 1981) (discussing role of
prosecutors in discovery phase based on "modified' adversary system).
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The term advocate is defined as an individual who "pleads the
cause of another."' 45
 The definition reflects the ideals contained in the
famous words uttered by Lord Brougham in his defense of Queen
Caroline before the House of Lords in 1820:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows, but one
person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save
that client by all means and expedients—and at all hazards
and costs to other persons and, among them, to himself, is
his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must
not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he
may bring upon others. 146
The position of advocate creates pressure to represent a side and
to be single-minded in persuading others of the rightness of your
position.'" A prosecutor advocating a position early in the investi-
gation is ill-suited to be an impartial judge of the law and of the
facts.' 18
The Supreme Court in a somewhat different context has acknow-
ledged that a prosecutor should not be an advocate in the investigation
of the case.' 49 In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, the Court addressed the issue
of qualified versus absolute immunity in a civil rights action against a
prosecuting attorney.'" In determining the type of immunity available
to the prosecutor, the Court looked to the function that the prosecutor
was performing when the alleged civil rights violation occurred.' 51 The
Court, holding that the prosecutor was entitled to only qualified im-
munity,'" stated that "a prosecutor neither is, nor should consider
himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone
arrested."'"
145 OXI,ORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 194 (2d ed. 1989).
146 Fried, supra note 65. In discussing Lord Brougham's declaration,Judgc Marvin Frankel
lamented that "Lord Brougham was wrong; we should be less willing to fight the world and ...
more concerned to save our own souls. As ministers of . justice, we should find ourselves more
positively concerned than we now are with the pursuit of truth." In re Hawaiian Flour Mills, Inc.,
868 13.2d 419, 437 (Haw. 1994) (Levinson,,[., concurring) (quoting WASH. POST, May 7, 1978).




	 generally Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478
(1990); !niftier v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976),
15°509 U.S. 259, 261.
151 Id. at 267-69.
152 1r1. at 269.
	15:3
	 at 266.
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2. The Flow of Information
The introduction of' the adversary process into the investigation
of the case seriously affects the ability of the prosecutor to obtain the
necessary information to make a proper charging decision. judge
Frankel, in his critique of the adversary process, urged consideration
of whether the system "made unduly elaborate and effective the means
of blocking proof of guilt."154 Courts have recognized that the profes-
sional responsibilities of defense counsel may require them to "become
obstacles of truth finding."i 55
The adversarial process is justified as being "the best method of
arriving at the truth, hence yielding a just outcome."' 56 The system
produces truth through a series of assertation and refutation.'"'' The
truth-seeking justification is premised on the assumption that each
adversary's lawyer will present. facts beneficial to his or her client and
attempt to avoid facts adverse to his client. Through this process, all
relevant facts will be presented to the tribunal, and the fact finder will
be able to ascertain the truth. The facts will be better presented by
each side than if one side attempted to present all the facts. It is
through the zeal present when one takes an adversarial position that
the completeness of the facts springs. One commentator analogizes the
non-adversary system to the attempt to play chess against oneself.
"Neither the black nor the white pieces get played well and second-rate
games result." 158 The system relies on the belief that truth can be found
through "legal combat."'"
Ironically, while a primary goal of the adversary system is truth,
the process puts greater focus on the rules of the battle rather than
the outcome. t "0 The adversary system has been lauded as a "celebration
of other values than truth."'''' The system is applauded for elevating
I " FRANKEL., supra ODIC 3, at 100.
I " See, e.g., Miranda v. Ariz Ila, 5144 U.S. 936, 519 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (observing
that necessity 'nay become an obstacle to truth-finding in fulfilling professional responsibilities);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., separate opinion) ("Any lawyer worth his
salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no state/stem to police under any
circumstances.").
"Allan Donagan,juslifting Legal Practice in the Adversary Sycletn, in THE Goon LAWYER 1 •27
(David Kuban ed., 1983).
157 Id. at 94.
ins
	 supra note 110, at 95.
159 Zacharias, supra note 69, at 59.
1 " M irjan Damaska, Evidentimy Barriers to Conviction and lion Models of Criminal Procedure:
A Comparative Study, 121 U. l'A. L. REV. 506, 581 (1973) (comparing common-law criminal justice
system with civil law).
11 ' 1 Id. at 580; Lubin, supra note 110, at 96. Professor Damaska indicates that some commen-
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human dignity to the "ultimate value" by allowing "individuals to pur-
sue as far as the law permits what they believe to be a reasonable and
justified result." 162
 The system is justified because individuals, as a
matter of "self realization," are entitled to the freedom to present their
positions. 163
 The adversary system provides a forum for the untram-
meled assertion of one's personal position. It allows even the obviously
guilty defendant the opportunity to have his "denials seriously weighed"
or his extenuation considered. 164
In many ways the adversarial criminal system is a recognition of
the historical American mistrust of public officials. 165 Some proponents
of the adversary system claim it functions as our basic protection
against government overreaching. 166 As one commentator put it, the
goal of the system is to prevent the "behemoth" state from becoming
the "juggernaut." 1"7
 The system is not a truth-seeking system, but rather
a "screening system." 169
 The adversary system is justified as a means of
placing the risk of error on the side of the prosecution. 169 By necessity,
the system places a heavy burden on the government when it attempts
to infringe on the rights of individuals. Put another way, it is a means
of "hobbling" the government.' 7° The system loses its focus on truth
seeking in favor of setting up a fair fight. The give and take of the
adversarial process may make for a fair fight but truth is lost some-
where in the process.rn As Professor Grano explains, "Equality between
tators argue that in both common-law and civil law systems, truth has the same importance.
Damaska, supra note 160, at 580. The difference between the two systems, so the argument goes,
is in how much weight is given to other values in relationship to the value given to truth. Id.
Professor Damaska points out that if one gives more weight to other values than io the value of
truth-seeking, then it follows that the truth-seeking ideal has less influence. Id. In the adjudicatory
area of criminal procedure, the values of individual rights and fair play are at least under-
standable. Id. In the beginning of the investigation, however, when the parties are attempting to
determine the existence of a criminal case, truth-seeking needs to weigh more heavily than the
other "celebrated values" of our system. Id.
162 Donagan, supra note 156, at 126.
163 Schwartz, supra note 117, at 154-55.
164 Donagan, supra note 156, at 128.
165 See Damaska, supra note 160, at 583.
166 1-tarry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission": Reflections on the "flight" to
Present a False Case, 1 Glue. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 143 (1987),
167
 Murray Schwartz, 77te Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 Am. B. Fouxo. RES. J. 543, 554
(1983).
1611 Subin, supra note 166, at 152.
169 Schwartz, supra note 117, at 158.
170 Luban, supra note 110, at 92.
171 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 213 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) ("Law
enforcement may have elements of a contest but it is not a game.").
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contestants makes for good sport, but in a criminal investigation we
should be seeking truth rather than entertainment." 172
C. The Court's Balancing of the Costs of an Adversarial Investigation
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the costs to
society outweigh the benefits of an adversarial process during the
investigation of a criminal case. The Court has concluded that the
adversarial process should begin when the defendant is charged with
a crime. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution is a critical part of
the adversary system, necessary to protect the defendant's rights.'" Yet,
even though the Supreme Court recognizes the importance of the
right to counsel, this right is limited to the post-indictment stage of a
criminal case.
The Court first addressed the issue of the right to counsel during
the investigation phase of a case in Cicenia v. La Gay. 174 The defendant
in Cicenia appealed his conviction claiming that his plea to murder was
based on an unlawfully obtained confessiOn. 175 The defendant had
been questioned by police for seven hours even though he repeatedly
requested an attorney and his attorney waited outside for him. 17G In
Cicenia, the Supreme Court in a pre-Miranda case held that the right
to counsel during a police interrogation "in most instances might
impair [the police's] ability to solve cases."'"Although the Court would
172 Joseph 1), Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Proftssional Interrogation and Modern
Confessions Law, 84 Mica. L. lbw, 662, 677 (1986); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the. Mind of
the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 Corum. L.
REV. 1137, 1174 (1987),
175 See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S.
193, 204 (1979); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 40; see generally Cu lombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568 (1961) (pre-Miranda case denying right to counsel during police interrogation).
174 357 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1958).
175 Id. at 507.
176 Id. at 506.
177 Id. at 509. The Court additionally relied on the incorporation doctrine. Id. at 510 (noting
that "the States should have the widest latitude in administration of their own systems of criminal
justice.").
It is important to note the difference between the right to counsel discussed under Sixth
Amendment. jurisprudence, which requires that an adversarial process has begun, and the right
to counsel discussed in the Miranda line of cases. See GRANO, supra note 11, at 145-46. The two
"rights" protect different issues. Id. The Miranda right to counsel deals with the inherent coercion
presumed to he present in custodial interrogation. Id. The right to counsel in those cases stems
front the need for protection against coerced confessions. Id. The Sixth Amendment right deals
with an attempt to level the playing field, a basic tenet of the adversary process, and therefore
does not arise until the adversary process is in place. Id. The rights protected by Miranda only
exist when the individual is subjected to custodial interrogation; Miranda, therefore, is inappli-
cable during the investigation stage of a case when no arrests have taken place. Id.
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later apply the right to counsel in the custodial interrogation area,'"
it would continue to uphold the idea that the search for truth and
solving of cases are primary goals of the investigation phase of a
criminal case. Accordingly, the Court has persistently found that the
application of the adversarial process during the investigation phase
may thwart truth-seeking goals.
Justice Stewart, who became the primary voice for the demarca-
tion between the investigation and the adversary process, first asserted
in Spano v. New York that post-indictment interrogation violated the
Constitution.' 79
 In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote that
interrogation without counsel violated the Constitution if the defen-
dant had been indicted)" He believed that the critical issue was whether
the interrogation took place during the "course of an investigation of
an unsolved crime" rather than post-indictment.'"'
Five years later, Justice Stewart was consistent in writing for the
majority in Massiah v. United States.' 82
 While some commentators have
called this an "oddball Sixth Amendment case" the case has had
"enduring qua I ty. "184 In Massiah, the defendant was convicted of nar-
cotics violations based partially on statements he made to a co-defen-
dant after his indictment and release on bail.' 85 Unbeknownst to the
defendant, the co-defendant agreed to work for the government and
allowed government agents to install a radio transmitter in his car. 186
During the course of the conversation, government agents listened to
the transmission. 187
 At trial, the government introduced several incrimi-
nating statements made by the defendant.' 88
 The defendant was con-
victed and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion.'"
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction based on the timing
of the interrogation.'" Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated
that "the petitioner was denied the basic protections of [the Sixth
178 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 443-45 (1966).
1 i8 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring).
180 /d. at 321 (Stewart, J., concurring).
181 Id. at 327 (Stewart, J„ concurring). See GRAND, supra note 11. at 150.
182 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964).
183 See. GRANO, SUPra note 1 1, at 150.
184 Uvillcr, sopro note 172, at 1155.




188 /d. at 206.
1211 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207.
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Amendment] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of
his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately
elicited after he had been indicted and in the absence of his coun-
sel."'" He opined that after the indictment "any secret interrogation
of the defendant without the protection afforded by the presence of
counsel, contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of
criminal causes and the fundamental rights of persons charged with
crime."'"2 The majority was concerned with the effect on the defen-
dant's representation if he is denied the protection of counsel "from
the time of his arraignment until the beginning of his trial."'" The
court, however, noted the critical necessity of "consultation, through-
going [sic]investigation and preparation," after the charges had been
issued.'"
The dissent, although strenuously objecting to the majority's po-
sition, did not discuss the timing of the right: to counse1. 195 justice
White's dissent reflected his concern over the opinion's "effect on law
enforcement's legitimate goal of maintaining its capacity to discover
transgressions of the law and to identify those who flaunt it." 196 The
dissent reasoned that this form of law enforcement did not "present
an unconstitutional interference" with the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.' 97 it concluded that the majority presented a "thinly disguised
constitutional policy" against the use of evidence from the "mouth of
the defendant"—a policy which the dissent believed has devastating
consequences on law enforcement.' 98
Justice Stewart's definition of where the adversary process begins
re-emerged in Kirby v. Illinois, in which his plurality opinion affirmed
the defendant's robbery conviction.'`-'`'The defendant's conviction was
19 ' Id. at 206.
192 Id. at 205 (quoting People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 565 (App. Ilk,. 1961)).
193
 Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (193'2)).
19.1 Id.
" Massiah, 377 U.S. at '205 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent contains no mention of the
bright line established lor the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
1 x'14. at 207 (White, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 209 (White,.., dissenting).
J98 hi. (White, J., dissenting).
19 406 U.S. 682, 688-89, 691 (1972), Between Messiah and Kirb', Justice Stewart's Sixth
Amendment analysis f ell out of favor for a short time. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-90
(1964). In Escobedo v. Illinois, the niAority halm! a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the
pre-indiclinent interrogation of a defendant. Id. The Court held that 'when the process shifts
from investigatory to accusatory—when its fcicus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a
confession—our adversary system begins to operate and under the circumstances here the
accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer." Id. at 490. Stewart Found himself in the
dissent again, writing that the Sixth Amendment protections did not attach at any point prior to
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based in part on a police station identification by the victim six weeks
before indictment. 2°" The defendant argued that he was entitled to
counsel and that the police line-up violated his Sixth Amendment
rights. 2'"
Relying on the "explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment,"
Justice Stewart limited the accused's right to counsel to the "criminal
prosecution."202
 He further recognized that there exists a starting point
for the adversary process in criminal cases:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a
mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system
of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the
government has committed itself to prosecute and only then
that the adverse positions of the government and defendant
have solidified.205
Justice Stewart wrote that it is only after the indictment that the
defendant "finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organ-
ized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and proce-
dural criminal law." 2°4
 He acknowledged that there must be a balancing
of the rights of a suspect with the interest of society. 2°5
 The postpone-
ment of the imposition of the adversarial process strikes such a bal-
ance:2m'
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court made clear that it would
not tolerate interrogation of any kind after the commencement of
formal proceedings. 207
 However, equally clear was its commitment to
keep the adversary process out of the investigative stage. 208 In Moran
the indictment. Id. at 493 (Stewartj., dissenting). Liter, in Kirby, the majority would limit Escobedo
to its facts and conclude that Escobedo was a case involving the need for counsel to protect against
the coercive nature of the police station during custodial interrogation. See GRANO, supra note
11, at 152.
20° Kirby, 906 U.S. at 685-87.
201 id, at 684-86. The Fifth Amendment was not implicated because the Court had previously
ruled that self-incrimination was not present in a line-up. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
223 (1967).
202 /d. at 690.
2°3 Id. at 689.
204 M.Justice Stewart articulated the interest as "the rights of a suspect to he protected from
prejudicial procedures and the interest of society in the prompt and purposeful investigation of
an unsolved crime." Id.
205 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 691.
2°6 Id.
207 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977).
208 See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178-79 (1991) (holding that Sixth Amendment is
offense-specific and, therefore, contact with defendant on uncharged crimes is permitted);
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v. Burbine, the Supreme Court re-asserted its rule that the right to
counsel does not attach until the defendant is charged. 2°° The defen-
dant was charged with the murder of Mary Jo Hickey, who died of
injuries inflicted to her skull by a lead pipe.21° The defendant was
arrested on a separate, unrelated burglary charge, 2 " and after being
informed of his Miranda rights and waiving them, he was questioned
about the Hickey murder.212 Although the defendant did not request
an attorney, his sister had retained an attorney. 213 The attorney called
the station and was told that the interrogation would not occur until
the next day.'" However, the interrogation occurred that night without
the attorney being notified or the defendant being notified of the
attorney's existence.2 '' The defendant subsequently confessed and the
confession was introduced at tria1. 21 '
In writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor found the defen-
dant's waiver of his right to remain silent valid. 2 " The Court held that
the Fifth Amendment did not require that the police inform the
suspect of the presence of a lawyer, nor inform the attorney of the
correct time of the interrogation:21 " Justice O'Connor concluded that
Miranda had struck a delicate balance between the interest of legiti-
mate law enforcement and the protection of the defendant against
coercion. 21 `1 Adding additional obstacles to the investigative effort had
a minimal benefit to the defendant but an extreme "cost to society's
legitimate and substantial interest in securing admissions of guilt. ”220
Justice O'Connor then turned to the Sixth Amendment issue. The
Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment
was to "assure that the prosecution's case encounters the crucible of
meaningful adversarial testing. "221 She acknowledged that the Sixth
Amendment is not a shield to protect a "suspect from the conse-
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292,297-09 (1990) (approving use of defendant's statements, made
to undercover police officer posing as defendant's cell mate, on uncharged murder case).
"9 475 U.S. 412, 429-30 (1986).
210 Id. at 416.
211 Id.
212 M. at 415.
21 '1 1d.
214 Moran, 475 U.S, at 415.
215 Id.
2111 Id. at 418.
217 1d. at 421-22.
21 " Id. at 423-25.
219 Moran, 475 U.S. at 426.
2211 1d. at 427.
221 Id. at 430 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
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quences of his own candor. "222 The Court recognized that the Sixth
Amendment requires only that the defendant have a zealous advocate
when the adversary system is in place. 222
The Court has recognized that the adversary process cannot begin
prematurely. There is a delicate balance between the protection of
individual rights and the rights of society to solve crimes and convict
criminals. The search for truth, if not the only goal of our criminal
justice system, must remain a paramount concern, at least in the
investigative stage of a case. 224
III. THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS AND THE ETHIcs CODES
The ethics codes have traditionally been a guide to all attorneys.
However, the investigative prosecutor must be guided during the in-
vestigation in a way that is consistent with the non-adversarial function
that she is performing. It is necessary to explore the codes to see how
they interact with the non-adversarial role of the investigating attorney.
A. The Adversarial Nature of the Ethics Codes
The American bar functioned for almost two centuries without
any formal code of ethics. 225 In the early 1900s, the ABA began prom-
ulgating ethics codes which were subsequently adopted by the states as
enforceable rules of the profession. 226 The ABA first codified the ethics
rules in 1908. Called the Canons of Professional Ethics, they were in
effect for sixty-two years. 227 In 1970, the ABA supplanted the Canons
with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which was adopted in
some form by every state within a few years:228 The states' variations in
the code were nominal, except in California which amended most of
the disciplinary rules and completely eliminated the ethical considera-
222 Id.
223 Id. The Court determined the presence of a zealous advocate is necessary to "assure that
the defendant is not left to his own devices." See also United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 16
(2d Cir. 1982) (holding that beginning of grand jury investigation does not constitute beginning
of adversarial proceedings).
'"See GRAND, supra note 11, at fi.
225 Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes,
59 TEX. L. REv. 689. 693 (1981); see also Amy Mashburn, Professionalism as Class ideology Civility
Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. 1. 14x. 657, 672 (1994) (indicating that ethics codes of today
stem from creation of ARA in early 1900s),
226 Mashburn, supra note 225, at 672.
227 HALL, supra note 88, at 2-3.
22N Id.
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tions. 22• In -1977, the ABA began the task of rewriting the ethics rules
and replacing them with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rule?) . 23" As of the fall of 1995, about thirty-eight states had adopted
the Model Rules in some form."'
The rules of lawyer conduct throughout the United States are
founded on the adversarial process. 232 As Professor Rhode noted, "In
any system of justice, particularly one whose central premise is combat-
ive, participants must share a common understanding of the ground
rules that constrain their partisanship." 233
 The ethics codes serve as the
ground rules for the legal profession. The rules assume the existence
of an adversarial system and attempt to structure adversarial practice. 231
The regulations seek to maintain a balance between the adversaries
and level the playing field between lawyers so that the "battle" can
proceed. 235
The professional codes regulate the relationships among the ad-
versarial entities: the adverse parties, the zealous advocates, and the
neutral tribuna1. 231s The ethics rules enforce three ideals, which reflect
the adversary nature of the code: confidentiality, loyalty and candor to
the court. 217 The first two ideals define the relationship between the
lawyer and his client and the third defines the relationship between
the lawyer and the neutral fact finder.
The code specifies that the attorney's ultimate duty is to his  cli-
ent. 2
 As part of his professional obligation, the lawyer must keep
confidential information that he receives from his client. The basic
rule is that "a lawyer shall not reveal any information relating to the
representation of a client .. This ideal reflects the adverse nature
of the system. Each adverse party is responsible for the presentation of
229 01.a:us & StmoN„tupra note 103, at XVii.
231)
231 Id,
272 Zacharias, .supra note 69, at 53.
2" Rhode, supra note 225, at 706.
271
 Zacharias„Nupra note 69, at 53. Professor Lawry discusses another assumption 111111erfying
the ethics code: there exists a "readily identifiable" client. See Lawry, soma ra.)1c 57, at 625.
2" United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. Stipp. 1430, 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (discussing Model
Rule 4.2 and noting that "the Disciplinary Rule is calculated to Iced balance to an adversarial
relationship").
236 See supra text accompanying notes 123-46.
2"	 supra note 46, al 1246.
2" Zacharias, su/».0 note 69, at 53 (describing duties of lawyer as representing his clients
zealously, remaining loyal at all times and keeping his clients' secrets).
419 MODEL Rut,Es or PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (I 983) . Rule I.ti contains exceptions,
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his case and has no duty to help the other side. 24° The second ideal
reflects the zealous nature of the advocate. The code requires that the
lawyer remain loyal to his client at all times. 241 The lawyer must repre-
sent his client zealously within the bounds of the law. 242
 As Professor
Lawry noted, "[A]t the heart of the Code of Professional Responsibility
[is the assumption] that the world is composed of two groups, clients
and non-clients; clients are to he embraced and non-clients to be kept
at arm's length."243
The third ideal reflected in the code is the requirement of candor
to the court.244
 This candor serves to regulate the presentation of the
evidence to the neutral tribunal in an adversary system. The fact finder
is not permitted to investigate the facts but must rely on the presentation
of the evidence by the adverse parties through their representatives. 24"
As Professor Hazard explains, "the profession's basic rules paint a
picture of protagonists who are faithful to client interest under a
governing but qualified obligation of truthfulness in dealing with the
courts:24" This basic adversarial premise is clearly manifested in the
anti-contact provisions of the rules.
B. The Anti-Contact Provision of the Ethics Codes
The anti-contact rule prohibits attorneys from communicating
with individuals who are represented by an attorney without the con-
sent of the individual's attorney. The rule has a long history, 247 and has
been adopted in almost every state in one form or another.248
 The
including 1) if the client "consents after consultation"; 2) "to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer"; and 3) the client fraud exception. Id.
24) See supra text accompanying notes 133-38.
24L MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNisbur Rule 1.7 cmt. (1983) ("loyalty is an essential
element in the lawyer's relationship to a client"); Qum. of PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1
(1981) ("professional judgment of the lawyer should be exercised ... solely for the benefit of his
client and free of compromising influences and loyalties").
242 Monist. Runts OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 crnt. (1983) (requiring lawyer to
advocate "with zeal"); CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1981) (lawyer's duty is to
"represent his client zealously").
245 Lawry, supra note 57, at 629.
144
 Hazard, Jr., supra note 46, at 1246.
24r' See supra text accompanying notes 137-47.
246 Hazard, Jr., supra note 46, at 1249.
217 United States v. Jamil, 546 E Supp. 646, 651-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that American
Bar has observed this rule since "time immemorial"), rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir.
1983).
148 Bruce A. Green, A Prosecutor's Communications with Represented Defendants: What Are the
Limits?, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 283, 284 (1988).
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anti-contact provisions speak in adversarial terms and thereby appear
to further the adversarial process.
1. The Language of the Anti-Contact Provisions
The anti-contact rule is found in essentially the same form in the
Model Rules and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model
Code"):249 Model Rule 4.2 states:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate
about the subject of the representation with a person the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer
or is authorized by law to do so.""
The language of the anti-contact rule reflects the same adversarial
components that are embodied in much of the code. The rule prohib-
its attorneys who "represent a client" from communicating with per-
sons about the "subject of the representation." All of these terms imply
adversarial relationships. The courts have agreec1. 251
The court in United States v. Ryans recognized that the anti-contact
provisions reflect an adversarial relationship and are misapplied to the
investigation of a criminal case. 252 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ investigated Donald Ryans for
alleged price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act."' During the
course of the investigation, the prosecuting attorney directed the FBI
to tape record three conversations between Ryans and a co-conspirator,
249 In 1995, the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility changed the word "party" in the anti-contact provision to the word "person." See
infra text accompanying notes 318-20.
Momi, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1995); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILIT5' DR 7-104 (A) (1) (1981) states:
A. During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not
1. Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the repre-
sentation with a party he knows to he represented by a lawyer in that matter unless
he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized
by law so to do.
251 See, e.g., United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990);
United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1366 (D.C. Cir, 1986); see alto United States v, Kenny, 645
F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir.) (pre-indictment tape recording does not implicate adversarial ethics
problems addressed by Code), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981); United States V. Lemonakis, 485
F.2d 941, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (contours of representation must be defined in order to apply this
ethical rule), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
252 903 F.2d 731, 738-39 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990).
2" /d. at 732.
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who was cooperating with the government. 251 At the time of the taped
conversations, the prosecuting attorneys knew that Ryans was repre-
sented by counse1. 25' Two and one-half years later, the government
indicted Ryans for violating the Sherman Act by conspiring, with un-
named co-conspirators, to restrain and suppress competition in the
provision of moving services, in unreasonable restraint of interstate
commerce. 2'6
 Ryans moved to suppress the statements contained in the
tape recordings. The district court suppressed the recordings, 257 finding
a violation of the anti-contact rule. 258
The Tenth Circuit in Ryans reversed the district court allowing for
the admission of the tape recordings into evidence. 259
 The court stated
that DR 7-104(A) (1) contemplated an adversarial relationship, which
does not exist during the investigation of a criminal case. 260
 The court
held that the rule did not apply until the commencement of the
criminal proceeding because the language of the rule contemplated
an adversarial process. 261
 The court reasoned that the terms "during
the course of the representation of a client" and "on the subject matter
of the representation" imply that an adversarial system is in place. 262
Further, the court defined a "party" as a litigant. 263
 The term "party"
implies that the positions of the advocates have been fixed. 264
251 14. at 734.
155 Id. In the conversations, Ryans talked about his meetings with his attorney. Id.
2 '56 14. at 735.
257 Ryans, 903 F.2d at 733. Only two of the taped conversations were suppressed. Id. Although
the third conversation was not suppressed, Ryans did not challenge the District Court's ruling.
14.
2511 Id, at 734.
21."' Id. at 741.
216 14. at 737. The court distinguished its earlier decision in United States v. Thomas, 474
F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), fert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973), because the defendant's right to counsel
had attached a nd the defenclant was in custody. Id. The court noted, however, that the holding
announced in Thomas. "clearly contemplated an adversarial relationship." Id.
261 Id. at 739.
262 Ryans, 903 F.2d at 739 ("Although the code does not define these terms [representing a
client], the rule appears to contemplate an adversarial relationship between litigants.").
21'3 hi. The newly enacted Model Rule uses the term 'person" instead of "party." Due to the
recency of the change, however, no states have yet adopted the ABA amendment. For an example
of a version of Rule 4.2 that reflects the ABA amendment but was enacted previously, see Fi.oRtmk
Ruus or PROFESSIONAL CoNtmcr Rule 4-1.2 (1994), which provides in part:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to he represented by another lawyer
in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer.
21"1 SPe Cminton & Udell, supra note 22, ;it 333; Uviller, supra note 172. See also United States
v. Partin, 610 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 446 U.S. 964 (1980) (finding that person remains
"party" flu -
 purposes of anti-contact rule even after COISVICIIMI, sentence and appeal).
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The language of the anti-contact rule reflects its application to an
adversarial process. The term "represent a client" implies that an
adversarial system is in place. The lawyer is performing his required
role in the adversary system: that of the "zealous representative." 26'`' This
rule tempers the advocate's "zeal" by defining the behavior appropriate
in performing his duty. The term implies that the client is identifiable,
and that the attorney is representing one client. 2"" In those codes that
retain the term "party," the language of the rule denotes that it does
not apply until the formal proceeding begins. 261 Finally, the rule pro-
hibits only those conversations dealing with "the subject matter of the
representation."'" The term "subject matter of the representation"
implies that the scope of the criminal case has been defined. 21"' The
accusatory instrument defines a criminal case."'" As one district court
noted: "[A] criminal case is nebulous until the time of the formal
initiation of the prosecution." 271 The rule is deeply rooted in the ad-
versarial model of dispute resolution.
2. The Objectives of the Anti-Contact Rule
In addition to the language of the rule implicating the formation
of an adversarial relationship, the purposes asserted for the rule imply
an adversarial model of fact finding. In Papanicoktou v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York stated that the anti-contact rule "guarantees fairness in the
adversarial system."272 Several purposes for the rule have been asserted,
all stemming from the adversarial nature of a zealous advocate for each
side of the controversy. Courts have recognized that the rule protects
265 See supra text accompanying notes 128-35.
26' 3 George Hazard staled, 'The legal profession's rules of ethics provide what. is perhaps worse
than no guidance Ion the issue of client-identity]. Instead of saying how or on what grounds the
question of client identity is to be resolved, they assume it has somehow been resolved ex ante."
Lawry, supra note 57, at 632.
267 Cramton & Udell, supra note 22; E Dennis Saylor, [V & Douglas Wilson, Putting a Square
Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of Model Role 4,2 to &demi Prosecutors, 53 U. Pirr. L. Row.
459, 469 (1992).
2118 Mono. RULES 017 PROFESSIONAL CoNnuct - Rule 4.2 (1983).
269 Cramton & Udell, super. note 22, at 335.
27° Lemonakis, 485 F.2d at 955 (finding that in investigatory stage of case, contours of "subject
matter of the representation . , . were less certain and thus less susceptable to the damage of
;mini legal questions"). Cf Illinois v. Perkins, 476 U.S. 292, 298 (1090) (holding that Sixth
Amendment attaches only to offenses linind in charging instrument).
271 Guerrerio, 675 F. Stipp. at 1438.
272 720 F. Stapp, 1080, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Amy Mashburn, A Clockwork Orange
Approach to Legal Ethics: A Conflicts Perspective on the Regulation of Lav*ers by Federal Courts, 8
GE0. J. LEGAL linnes 473, 480 (1995).
958	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 37:923
the attorney-client relationship. 273 Others have suggested that the rule
preserves the abilities of the lawyer to monitor the client's case. 271 The
anti-contact provision, some argue, seeks to address the imbalance
between the knowledge and skill of a lawyer and the knowledge and
skill of the lay person. 275 The rule protects the client from entering into
an "ill-considered settlement." 276 The rule is premised on the notions
of "fairness in the adversarial system."277 •
Because the language and purpose of the rule reflect its basic
adversarial premise, its application to the investigation of a criminal
case is misplaced. Although Model Rule 4.2 continues to be the source
of substantial disagreement between prosecutors and the defense bar,
the debate has failed to address the root of the problem. Instead, each
side is attempting to define, and thereby control, access to information
during the investigation of a case—one to gain access and the other
to limit it.
C. The Debate Over the Initiation of the Adversary System
The rhetoric of the anti-contact debate focuses on conflicting
perceptions. The criminal defense bar perceives that the DOJ has
attempted to exclude its lawyers from the rules of ethics. The DOJ
perceives that the defense bar is more interested in subverting the
process than in the "search for truth." The issue is whether the adver-
sary system is appropriate in the investigation phase of a case.
The courts have routinely found the anti-contact rule to be appli-
cable to prosecutors275 and law enforcement authorities acting as the
prosecutor's alter ego.279 The courts, however, have not consistently
273 See, e.g., United States v. Batchelor, 484 F. Stipp. 812 (F.D. Pa. 1980).
274 See, e.g., Neals-Erik William Delker, Ethics and the Federal Prosecutor: The Continuing
Conflict Over the Application of the Model Rule 4.2 to Federal Attorneys, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 855, 858
(1994).
275 See, e.g., Alafair S.R. Burke, Reconciling Professional Ethics and Prosecutorial Power: The
No- Contact Rule Debate, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1635, 1639 (1994); Uviller, supra note 172, at 1137.
276 Saylor & Wilson, supra note 267, at 464.
277 Papanicalaou, 720 F. Supp. at 1084.
278 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Hann-Dad, 858 F.2d 834, 838140 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990); United States v.
Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964, 968-70 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 54 F.3d 825, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1995);Jamii,
546 F. Stipp. at 652; see also Ryans, 903 F.2d at 735 ("It is now well settled that [the anti-contact
rule] applies to criminal prosecution as well as civil litigation"). Some state courts have refused
to apply the anti-contact rule. See, e.g., State v. Richmond, 560 1'.2d 41, 46 (Alaska), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 915 (1977); State v. Nicholson, 463 P.2d 633, 636-37 (Wash. 1969).
279 See Hammad, 858 F.2d at 837-38: United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927, 934 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 932 (1988); Tamil, 707 F.2d at 645; United States v. McNaughton, 848 F. Supp.
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applied the rule to the investigative stage of the case. 28 ') Prior to 1988,
most courts held that the anti-contact provision was inapplicable to the
pre-indictment investigation of a criminal case. 281 A few courts recog-
nized that the anti-contact rule might be implicated in the pre-indict-
ment. stage of a criminal case but refused to find a violation.282 However,
in 1988, a New York district court found that the anti-contact rule had
been violated and suppressed several statements made by a suspect
during the investigation of a case. 283 A debate ignited over the use of
the anti-contact provision to prohibit prosecutors from continuing an
investigation through contacting represented suspects.
in United States v. Hammad, the Second Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's suppression of evidence based on a violation of the rule. 284
However, it. failed to limit the reach of the anti-contact rule into the
investigation of a case. The court refused to link the application of the
anti-contact rule to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, finding that the
protections involved with the anti-contact provision were different, than
those afforded under the Sixth Amendment. 285 Additionally, the court
was concerned that since the prosecutor could control the indictment
process, she could delay the indictment in order to avoid the con-
straints of the rule. 28"
In responding to the impact of the Hammad ruling, the DOJ
unfortunately focused the debate on the issues of the Supremacy Clause.
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh penned a memorandum, answer-
ing what he termed the "expansive reading" given to the anti-contact
rule, with what some would call his expansive reading of the authority
of the DOJ.287 After outlining the history of several recent cases dealing
1195,1202 (E.D. Pa. 1994); cf. United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62,66 (2d Cir. 1962), reed on
other grounds, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
280
	 Ryans, 903 F2d at 739 (holding that rule does not apply to investigation); Hammad,
846 F.2d 854,858 (same), amended by 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
281 See, e.g., Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1366; United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328,1333 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983); United States v, Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16,17 (2d Cir. 1982); Kenny,
645 F.2d at 1327; Lemonaki,5, 485 F.2d at 954-56; Burke, supra note 275; Karlin, supra note 12,
at 702-03; Mashburn, supra note 272, at 277.
282 See, e.g., United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1223,1224-25 n.3 (E.D,N.Y. 1981);
see also United States v. Weiss, 599 F.2t1 730,740 (5th Cir. 1979) (indicating that government had
"flirted with" violation of anti-contact rule by contacting criminal suspect, knowing that he was
represented by counsel).
285 Hammad, 858 F.2d at 841.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 839.
2813 Id.
287 Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, Memorandum to all Justice Department Litigators
Re: Communication with Persons Represented by Counsel at I, In re Doe, 80! F. Stipp. 478,
488-93 (D.N.M. 1992) [hereinafter 15deami. See Mashburn, supra note 268, at 517 (discussing
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with the application of the rule of conduct in a criminal case, Thorn-
burgh announced the DOJ's position. 288 He indicated that although
the states could regulate the ethical conduct of those attorneys who
they license, the states' authority was limited to those areas which did
not conflict with federal law. 289 The memorandum exempted investiga-
tion from the ambit of the anti-contact rule because the prosecutor is
"authorized by law" to conduct undercover investigations,m and the fed-
eral authority to direct federal investigations preempts any state rule. 2"t
The immediate response from the criminal defense bar and the
ABA was to respond to the preemption assertion. 292 The ABA House
of Delegates overwhelmingly approved a resolution that addressed the
attempt by the DOJ to "unilaterally" exempt its lawyers from the ethics
codes that regulate all lawyers. 2"" One ABA delegate deemed the posi-
tion "sheer governmental arrogance."2"4
Some courts were equally appalled by the actions of the Attorney
Genera1:295 In United States v. Lopez, the court called the Attorney
questitinable authority of DOJ to regulate attorney ethics in light of derivative admissions require-
ments).
258 Memo, supra note 287, at 2-3.
259 Id. at 3.
`4)f)
291 Id.
29'2 See Nancy J. Moore, Intro Professional War/Um Between Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys: A
Plead far an End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 515, 517 (1992). Torn Watson, AG
Decrees Prosecutors May Bypass Counsel, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 26, 1089, at l (quoting one lawyer
who proclaimed Thornburgh memo was "a declaration of Tom Watson, Thornburgh Memo
Has Defense Bar Up In Arms, MANHATTAN LAW., Oct. 3, 1980, at 4 (Michael Bender, Chairman-
elect of ABA's Critninal Justice Section accused Attorney General of "playing footloose with the
traditional rules"); ABA STANDING COMM. Oa' PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE El' Al.., REPORT TO HOUSE
OF DELEGATES 3 (Feb. 1990) (claiming that federal prosecutors have attempted to exempt
themselves from "time-honored" ethics rules). See also Richard Thornburgh, Ethics and the
Attorney General: The Attorney General Responds, 74 JuDIcATufw 290 (1991) (Attorney General
responded to criticism leveled at him by accusing defense bar of using Model Rules as defense
tactic to protect their clients).
293 6 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 25, 27 (1990). The full text of the resolution
states:
That it is the policy of the American Bar Association
a, That. Department of Justice lawyers may lilt he given blanket exemption from
the requirements of Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct or
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A) (1) of the predecessor ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility as adopted by individual jurisdictions.
b. To oppose any attempts by the Department of Justice unilaterally to exempt its
lawyers from the professional conduct rules that apply to all lawyers under the
applicable rules of the jurisdictions in which they practice.
Id.
291 Cramton & Udell, supra note 22, at 321.
295 There are only a few cases that addressed the Thornburgh memorandum. See, e.g., United
States v. Ferrara, 847 R Supp. 054 (D.D.C. 1993); see also In re Doe, 801 F. Stipp. at 478, 480
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General's attempt to exempt DOJ attorneys from the application of
this rule "an arrogation of power" and a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. 2•' The Lopez court thoroughly analyzed the Thorn-
burgh Memorandum, denouncing the memorandum as "preposter-
ous"297 and "nothing less than a frontal assault on the powers of the
court." 295
The debate became a tug of war over who should regulate rather
than what should be regulated. 2"" Finally in 1994, the DOJ promulgated
federal regulations defining the role of the prosecuting attorney in
contacting represented parties."" During the comment period, com-
ments were received from a variety of sources." Many of the comments
addressed the authority issue."2
 The federal regulations which were
enacted attempted to address the adversarial roles versus the non-ad-
versarial roles of government attorneys. First, the regulations distin-
guish federal attorneys by the nature of their practice. The new regu-
lations only applied to those attorneys involved in law enforcement and
not all government attorneys."' Second, the regulations differentiate
the role of the federal prosecutor based on the status of the case. The
federal prosecutor's role differs under the regulations depending on
whether she is dealing with a named defendant, identified as a "repre-
sented party," or an individual who has not been charged, identified
as a "represented person."'" Finally, the regulations distinguished the
adversarial activities of the federal prosecutor that look like prosecu-
tion from those non-adversarial activities that are part of the investiga-
tion. The regulations permit the prosecutor to contact a represented
(condemning Attorney General for displaying "an arrogant disregard" 14 ethics of legal profes-
shin); United States v. Adonis, 744 F. Stipp, 336, 347 n,50 (D.D.C. 1090) (finding that memoran-
dum by Attorney General is not superior to rules issued by federal court).
296 765 F. Stipp. 1433, 1455 (N.D. Gal. 1991). This case dealt with an attorney contacted by
a represented defendant after the indictment. hi. at 1455.
297 M. at 1453,
298 N. at 1463.
294 For a comprehensive summary of the debate over the Memo, see Mashburn, .supra note
272, at 487-88.
""'The federal regulations were first introduced in 1992. After President Clinton was elected,
however, Attorney General Janet Reno postponed the effective date of the regulation so that she
could review the regulations and obtain additional comments, In addition, comment periods were
extended to obtain mo re response. For a complete history of the rule, see Final justice Department
Rule on Communications with Represented Persons, 55 Grim. L. Rep. (RNA) 2269 (1994) (discussing
59 Fed. Reg. 39,910 (1994) (to be codified as 28 C.F.R. pt.. 77)) [hereinafter Final Rule).
:'° Id. at '2272.
"2 Id. One comment read, "1 do not know why it is that the department somehow thinks it
can exempt its attorneys from the rules of conduct that all of the lawyers must abide by." Id.
903 Id, at 2274.
"4 Id. at 2278.
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individual either directly or through another person during the course
of an investigation. However, the regulations prohibit prosecuting at-
torneys from entering into conversations of an adversarial nature, such
as plea negotiations or immunity agreements, without the consent of
the lawyer.'")5
The ABA responded to the regulations with an amendment to the
anti-contact. provision. 3°6 In the report that accompanied the amend-
ment to Model Rule 4.2, the ABA indicated that the model rule was
intended to apply to the investigation of the case. 307
 The amendment
sought to overrule those courts that found that the rule did not apply
to the investigation of a criminal case. 308
 The ABA's intention was to
bring application of this adversarial code provision into the investiga-
tion phase of the case and hamper the prosecutor's neutral fact finding
process.
The result of these actions leaves the investigating attorney in a
quandry. The DOJ encourages its attorneys to be involved in the
pre-indictment investigation." However, investigating attorneys may
face sanctions or disbarment based on actions permissible in one state
but impermissible in another. 31 ° The federal prosecutor is still without
guidance as to the aspects of the non-adversarial role she must play in
the investigation of the case.
IV. NON-ADVERSARIAL ETHICS PROVISIONS FOR
INVESTIGATING ATTORNEYS
If the adversarial system does not apply to the investigation of the
case, then the current professional responsibility codes, premised on
the adversarial process, provide no direction to an investigating attor-
ney. Yet, the prosecutor is in need of guidance and regulation in the
important area of investigations. 3 " The current ethics codes do not
:305 Final Rule, supra note 300, at 2278.
3  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1995) (amended Aug. 8, 1995); see
Model Rule 4.2, 64 U.S.L.W. 2097 (Aug. 15, 1995).
307
 Model Rule 4.2, 64 U.S.L.W. 2097.
"8 Id.
3°9 Final Rule, supra note;
 300, at 2270.
310
 Florida has made it clear that it intends to enforce its ba•'s rule regardless of the DO]
regulations. Gary Blankenship, Ethics Panel Affirms Opinion on Federal Prosecutors, FLORIDA B.
July 15, 1995, at 26 Florida Bar's Professional Ethics Committee rejected a request to
compromise on the issue and reaffirmed the earlier ethics opinion which prohibited federal
prosecutors from contacting represented defendants. Id.
311 Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and
Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. RED'. 851, 873-79 (1995) (suggesting that
financial incentives, not guidance, are needed to encourage appropriate prosecutorial behavior).
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recognize the different role played by the prosecuting attorney when
she is investigating a case and fail to provide any instruction other than
to mandate that the prosecutor "do justice."312
A. 7'he Need for Specific .Provisions
One commentator stresses that "it is important for the courts,
scholars, bar associations and the press to keep reminding prosecutors
that they must comply with an entirely different set of standards than
those applicable to the defense bar."313 If this is true, then clear stand-
ards must be delineated:314 The idea that ethics codes need to "acknow-
ledge that norms of professional conduct may vary depending on the
role of the attorney" is not a novel idea."'
There are several benefits to a code that specifically addresses the
ethical problems unique to the investigating attorney. Specific regula-
tions that proscribe proper conduct make enforcement easier and
allow offended parties to explicitly identify misconduct based on the
specified rules. The new requirements would allow for the enforce-
ment of non-adversarial standards. Although prosecutors are currently
subject. to disciplinary procedures, 3 "' many scholars have lamented the
lack of enforcement against federal prosecutors. 317 One reason that
312 Zacharias, supra note '3, at 249 n.83 (noting that ethics codes fail to identify unique
responsibilities and issues facing prosecuting attorney). For an interpretation and criticism of this
broad undefined standard, see id. at 249.
313 LAWLESS, .supra note 4, at xv (quoting Alan M. Dershowirz).
514 The 1958 ABA report concerning professional responsibility stated that the prosecutor
should not use the standards of an attorney appearing on behalf of a client as a guide to her
conduct. Professional Responsibility: Report of Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. j. 1159, 1218 (1958).
515 Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and
Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDIIAM URIA. L.J. 969, 975 (1992); see generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978); see also Mashburn, .supra note 225, at 666 (noting
that "fundamental differences among lassyers stemming from a variety of factors, including
functional specialization ... flourish beneath a deceptively cohesive su•face").
316 SW, e.g., United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 904 (D.D.C. 1993); In n? Doe, 801 F. Supp.
478 (D.N.M. 1992); see also United States v. Kelly, 550 F. Stipp. 901, 902 (D. Mass. 1982) (applying
Massachusetts law but imposing no discipline); Waters v. Barr, 747 P.2d 900, 902 (Nev. 1987)
(federal prosecutor was subject to state law even though not licensed in that state).
317 See GF.RSIIMAN, supra note 85, at 1-51 (attorney disciplinary sanctions are so rarely
imposed as to make their "use virtually a nullity"); LAWLESS, supra note 4, at 599 (disciplinary
sanctions against prosecuting attorneys are the exception, not the rule); Albert W. Alschuler,
Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial judgrs, 50 TEX. L. REV. 029, 673 (1972) ("courts
have sometimes exhibited a strange hesitancy to subject prosecutors to the rules that are appli-
cable to other lawyers").
Additionally. commentators have noted that on the rare occasions when prosecutors are
disciplined, the sanctions imposed amount to little more than "a slap on the wrist." See, e.g., Price
v. State Bar, 30 Cal. 3d 537 (1982) (upholding suspension of Price for two years despite that
Price was guilty of lying, deceit, fabrication of evidence, collusion with defendant and extended
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prosecutors are rarely disciplined is that the standards which guide
their behavior are so genera1. 318 Investigating prosecutors should be
required by the ethics standards of their profession to undertake the
role of neutral judge of the facts.
Specific ethics regulations are essential because of the lack of an
adversary in the investigative stage. 31 ' The adversary system has the
by-product of keeping the government in check.m The lack of the
adversary system during the investigation of a case should not be seen
as an "unleashing" of the prosecutorial forces, unfettered by rule or
ruler. Ethics regulation will control the prosecutor in the investigation
stage, whether through internal or external restraints. 32 '
The greatest benefit of these additional code provisions is not in
their enforceability by disciplinary bodies, but in their impact on a
prosecutor's self rellection."2 The proposed code provisions would
recognize the distinct non-adversarial role of the investigating attorney.
Recognition will sensitize prosecutors to the important issues they must
consider in exercising their discretion. The creation of clear rules will
force investigating attorneys to consider the issue of impartiality, an
issue they may have previously failed to consider. 323
Additional ethics provisions will encourage right thinking and
right behavior in other ways. The most obvious is that it can instruct
prosecutors as to the specific ethics behavior or responsibility required.
Although the area of investigation and charging is largely discretion-
cover-up), noted in Richard Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions against Prosecutors for Brady Violations:
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 728 (1987) ("It strains the imagination to conceive of more
egregious conduct than in Price's case."); hi re Carpenter, 808 P.2d 1341 (1991) (prosecutor was
merely censored for using false testimony at trial); see also Va. Court Criticized for Refusing to Disbar
DA, NAT'l. L.J., August 17, 1987, at 5 (reporting that Virginia Supreme Court reversed disbarment
or prosecutor for clear Brady violation and that court held that the defendant was not prejudiced
because witness had contacted the defendant himself).
318 Zacharias, supra note 69, at 48. Other reasons asserted for the lack of discipline include
a hostile attitude on the part of the judiciary toward claims of prosecutorial misconduct based
on the relationship of the judiciary to the prosecutors' office, difficulty in obtaining evidence to
successfully pursue violations, and a lack of expertise in the criminal law area which causes
disciplinary bodies to be reluctant to judge prosecutorial conduct. Bruce A. Green, Policing
Federal Prosecutors: Do Tim Many Regulators Produce "lbo Little Enforcement, 8 Sr. THOMAS L. RE.v.
69, 70 (1995).
519 Fisher, supra note 74, at 225 (recognizing that presence of adversarial safeguards allows
prosecutor to act more like advocate and less like impartial minister of justice).
" F See supra text accompanying notes 171-78.
321 See Deborah L. Rhode, supra note 225, at 707 (ethics codes "promote the appearance and
reality of justice, both of which ultimately rebound to the benefit of the profession").
322 Id. at 709 (noting benefits of professional codes "in narrowing attorney's capacity for
self-delusion about the propriety of a given action").
323 Zacharias. supra note 3, at 256 11.99.
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ary, "[al s 'professionals,' prosecutors probably are capable of exercis-
ing discretionary judgment in a manner consistent with general norms
of behavion"24 Professor Zacharias suggests that a key component of
any role-defining regulation is its ability to cause introspection. 325 The
key to an effective code section is that it guides attorneys to select
appropriate behavior.""
Further, code sections specifically addressing investigating attor-
neys would allow prosecutors a mechanism to refuse to perform ques-
tionable conduct imposed upon them by supervisors.''27 For example,
the prosecutor can point to a provision that clearly requires her to seek
all evidence when sending an investigating officer back to obtain ad-
ditional information." Specific provisions that address the issues fac-
ing prosecuting attorneys would serve to reinforce the resolve in most
prosecutors to do the right thing. 32"
B. The Initiators of the Provisions
The pressing issue that now faces federal prosecution is the regu-
lation of investigations by local bars that have no regulations to cover
the non-adversarial activities of federal prosecutors."" The problem
needs to be solved by the adoption of uniform rules in this area.
Although the ABA has traditionally fashioned standards that were later
adopted by the individual states, 3" 1 in the area of federal criminal
prosecution, the ABA is not the best choice. The DOJ seems the natural
place to look.
324 Id. at 258.
325 id
524' Professor Steele framed the question regarding ethics codes as "not how to eliminate
discretion but how to control it so as to avoid the unequal, the arbitrary, the discriminatory, and
the oppressive." Walter W. Steele, jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate. Discipline, 38 Sw, L.J
965, 966 (1985).
527 Mark Davies, Governmental Ethics Laws: Myths and Mylhos, 40 N.Y.L. scan. t.. RE Y, 177, 178
(1995).
328 Professor Zacharias stressed the importance of this code function from the defense
attorney's perspective, noting that code sections that are specific allow the defense attorney to
freely refuse to perform unethical acts at the client's request. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 267; see
also Rhode, supra note 225, at 709.
ytu Norton, supra note 13, at 303.
73" ABA Model Rule 4.2, 1995 Amendments Report clearly indicates that the amenchnent was
intended to apply to the "investigative activities" of prosecutors. Eric Rieder, Evidence front the
Opposition, 22 Lain. 17, 22 (1995).
331 See supra text accompanying notes 234-44); see also Mashburn, supra note 225, at 657
(noting dominance and control ABA now exercises over regulation of lawyers based on implicit
delegation by states to ABA to promulgate rules); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73
Titx. L. REV. 335, 380 (1994) (discussing limited experimentation by states in devising their own
rules).
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Recently, commentators have questioned the non-partisan nature
of the ABA and its expertise in fashioning ethics rules."2 In addition
to the commentators, prosecutors have traditionally viewed the ABA as
an arm of the criminal defense bar.'" The prevailing prosecutorial
perspective is that the ABA often adopts rules that create "a litigation
advantage."33^ It is difficult to imagine that this perception would change
if the ABA adopted additional constraints on prosecutors.
The adoption by the ABA of the investigative regulations as model
rules does not ensure that they will become law. The states are free to
fashion different rules or to reject the rules altogether. 335 Therefore,
the rules are not guaranteed to be uniform in their adopted form.
Further, the time and expense of adoption of the rules would lead to
a great time lapse between their production and adoption. The issues
raised by the lack of guidance for, and control of, investigating attor-
neys is a pressing issue that needs to be quickly and efficiently solved.
Finally, in light of the reaction to the protracted debate over Model
Rule 4.2, the ABA appears unwilling to acknowledge the need for a
separate set of regulations that address this issue. On several occasions,
the ABA has stated their position that the model code as written is
sufficient."'
The DOJ should be the entity to begin the creation of prosecution
standards for the investigating attorney. Since the DOJ is the supervis-
332 See jrniko K. LIE BERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: LAWYERS' UNETHICAL. ETHICS AND WHAT
To Do ABOUT 1•r 216-17 (1978) (noting that ABA could never act as neutral body in drafting
ethics provisions because it cannot overcome "the conflict of interest inherent in balancing
self-interest against public and client interest"); Mashburn, supra note 225, at 673 (concluding
that "a privileged, powerful group of elite lawyers continues to control the collective identity of
the occupational class"); Saylor & Wilson, supra note 267, at 461 (rioting that of 400,000 ABA
members, about 3,800 identify themselves as prosecutors); see also Cramton Sc Udell, supra note
22, at 361 (criticizing adoption of attorney-subpoena rules as "the use of a state forum in which
the bar has special privilege and political influence to override longstanding principles of federal
constitutional, substantive and procedural law").
333 See john Flynn Rooney, Thornburgh Says ABA Rules Hurt Prosecutor's Efforts, CH' DAILY
L. BULL., Aug. 6, 1990, at I (summarizing justice Department's position on ABA and criminal
bar for attempting to use ethics rules to stymie criminal investigations); Torn Watson, Prosecutors
See ABA as Arm of Defense Ban LECAL TIMES, Sept. 17, 1990, at 6 (indicating that prosecutors
view new ABA standards as exemplifying ABA's partisan attitude toward them).
334 Donald Wise, Are Federal Prosecutors Beyond State Discipline?, N.Y. Li., Mar. 8, 1991, at 1, 2.
331
 For example, most states that adopted the ABA's Model Rules changed individual provi-
sions. See Duncan T. O'Brien, Multistate Practice and Conflicting Ethical Obligations, 16 Surort
HALL L. AIN, 678, 680 (1986).
"'The ABA has indicated its belief that ItIo the extent that there may be reasons to apply
a different rule to prosecutors ... the Department of Justice should seek to amend the Model
Rules and the individual jurisdictional rules traditionally based on those rules." Nancy J. Moore,
Intra-Professional Warfare. Between Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys: A Plea for an End to the Cut ,eat
Hostilities, 53 U. Pin- . L. REV. 515, 525 n.63 (1992).
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ing entity for all federal prosecutors, the implementation of ethics
rules which govern conduct during the investigation of a case would
solve the current problem of splintered regulation. Congress has al-
ready proposed legislation that would delegate the regulation of fed-
eral prosecutors to the DOJ, 337 and the DOJ has the expertise and
knowledge to undertake these issues. Additionally, a code devised by
federal prosecutors may be more readily received by the prosecution
community at not only the federal level but the state level as well.
1. The Job Has Been Assigned
In the proposed Crime bill of 1995, Congress delegated the authority
to regulate federal prosecutors to the DOJ. Congress mandated that
"[n]otwithstanding the ethical rules or the rules of the court of any
State, Federal rules of conduct adopted by the Attorney General shall
govern the conduct of prosecutors in the courts of the United States. """m
This legislation assigns the governing of the conduct of federal prose-
cutors, which now number in the thousands,'" to the DOJ.
If passed, such legislation would put the issues of prosecutorial
regulation into the hands of many career prosecutors. It would afford
the DOJ the opportunity to demonstrate its ability and willingness to
adopt an even-handed code of ethical conduct for prosecutors. The
pre-indictment investigative stage of a criminal case has not been
addressed in the state codes, which are adopted from the ABA mod-
els.54° This area is ripe for the creation of a code that could guide and
influence state regulation of investigating prosecutors.
The need for uniformity in the regulation of attorneys in the
federal system is unquestionable."' Because the DOJ supervises all
337 S. 3, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1995).
338 Id.
""At the close of fiscal year 1994, the United States Attorneys' offices employed 4323
attorneys. U.S. DEI''T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT: UNITED STATES AITORNEYS' OFTICES
FISCAL YEAR 1994, at 1 (1995).
a4° Even the ABA Standards for Criminal ...Justice	 to guide the prosecutor in conducting an
investigation because they fail to recognize the magnitude of the prosecutor's involvement in the
complex investigation. ABA SrANnARns FOR CitimINAI. JUSTICE Standard 3-3.1 (1992) ("A prose-
cutor ordinarily relies on the police and other investigative agencies investigation of alleged
criminal acts.").
341 For a discussion on proposals to adopt a comprehensive federal code of professional
responsibility, see Zacharias, supra note 69, at 335. See generally Eli J. Richardson, Demystifying the
Federal Law of Attorney Ethics, 29 GA. L. REV. 137 (1994); Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes
and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and Suarestions for Reform, 19 FoluntAxi URn. L.J. 125
(1991).
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federal prosecutors, regulations adopted by the DOJ would apply to all
federal prosecutors and thereby affect uniformity.
2. Skills and Expertise to Undertake the Task
The role of investigating attorney is a relatively new concept," 2 a
role that is most familiar to the DOJ as the supervising agency."3
 The
DOJ has already established some regulations regarding the conduct
of federal prosecutors, although none of the regulations deal with their
ethical obligations.
The United States Attorney's Manual contains the beginnings for
the proposed provisions. Although the Manual is itself more of a "how
to" document, it identifies some role definitions. An example of an
attempt to define the prosecutor's role is in the area of her relationship
with the grand jury. The Manual defines the role of the prosecutor as
follows:
In his/her dealings with the grand jury, the prosecutor must
always conduct himself/herself as an officer of the court
whose function is to insure that justice is done and that guilt
shall not escape nor innocence suffer. . . . The prosecutor's
responsibility is to advise the grand jury on the law and to
present evidence for its consideration. In discharging these
responsibilities, he/she must be scrupulously fair to all wit-
nesses and must do nothing to inflame or otherwise improp-
erly influence the grand jurors."'
This provision is an example of a currently existing rule within the
DOJ that should become part of a code of conduct enforceable
against the investigating attorney. This section indicates that the
DOJ has the expertise to define a non-adversarial role for the
investigating prosecutor.
Additionally, portions of the United States Attorney's Manual ex-
emplify the DOD's ability to list factors to guide the prosecuting attor-
ney's decision-making process. For example, in the area of immunity,
the Manual does not seek to set Forth specific regulations or mandate
specific conclusions. Rather, the Manual seeks to "focus the decision-
maker's attention to certain factors."345
 This is the kind of provision
342 See supra text accompanying notes 78-93,
313 See generallyNloore, supra note 336, at 524 (noting that in investigative stage, prosecutor
is acting more as government official and less like lawyer representing client).
Std U.S. DEC . / . Mil/STILE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-11.020 (1994).
345
 The factors to he considered are:
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which should be contained in the investigating attorney's code of
ethics; it is an example of the DOJ's institutional ability to create
meaningful regulation to guide, instruct and focus the prosecuting
attorney to the issues underlying the exercise of her discretion.
Further, the DOJ has demonstrated its ability to consider differing
views in defining its ethics regulations."6 A clear example is the proce-
dure used to adopt the regulations defining communications with
represented parties. Although the DOJ originally published the con-
tents of its regulations on communications with represented persons
in the Federal Register on July 26, 1993, 347 the regulations did not
become law until August 4, 1994, and were totally rewritten." 8 During
the course of the adoption of those regulations, the DOJ extended the
comment period twice and republished different regulations on three
occasions. Attorney General Janet Reno created a working group com-
prised of individuals representing different viewpoints to create the
final rule."' Such a procedure could be adopted to look at the larger
questions regarding the regulation of the investigating attorney.
3. More Acceptable to the Prosecuting Community
While rules adopted by the DOJ will obviously directly affect the
behavior of the federal prosecutors, they will also have a persuasive
effect on state and local prosecutors. Although state officials would not
initially be governed by these regulations, the concepts of neutrality
A. The importance of the investigation cir prosecutitin to effective enfbrcement of
the criminal laws;
B. The value of the person's testimony or information to the invciaigatitin or
prosecution;
C. 'Hie likelihood of prompt and lull compliance with a compulsion order, and the
effectiveness of available sanctions if there is no sur,h compliance;
0. The person's relative culpability in co n nection with the ()Ileum! or offenses being
investigated or prosecuted, and his/her history with respect to criminal activity;
E. The possibility of successfully prosecuting the person prior to compelling
hint/her to testify to produce the information; and
F.The likelihood of adverse collateral consequences to the person if he/she testifies
or provides ittfOrmatiou under a compulsion order.
Id. § 9-23.210.
346
 Masi thorn, supra note 272, at 492 (noting that final rule appeared to "be a good faith
effort at a thoughtful and reasonable accommodation of the competing interests").
317 The full text of the rule with accompanyitig summary and supplemental inliirmatio II is
published in Final Rule, supra note 300, at 2269.
3414 Masliburn, supra note 272, at 492 (indicating that rule subsequently enacted was "sub-
stantially revised version of the proposed communications regulation").
:i49 A ItorneTaient Privilege, Private Attorntys, Reno Meet to Discuss DOJ Proposal on Ex Porte
Contacts, 60 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) l5 d4 (Oct. 18, 1993).
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and impartiality could act as a guide to the states." 5° Ethics codes will
encourage selkonstraint by stimulating attorneys to consider issues
that had not been previously explored in the day-to-day rush from one
case to another. Thoughtful ethics standards that actually address the
issues affecting prosecutors will cause self-evaluation. The impact of
the code provisions in encouraging self-evaluations depends on the
perception of the prosecutors that the rules are fair. They must balance
the legitimate rights of defendants against the legitimate interests in
effective law enforcement. Code provisions created by a law enforce-
ment entity are more likely to be accepted by prosecutors at both the
state and federal level than those created by an entity that is perceived
to he an arm of the defense bar.
C. Some Suggested Non-Adversarial Provisions
In drafting the new provisions of the ethics codes, the DOJ must
include both general and specific rules."" General sections must define
the role played by the prosecutor as a non-adversarial, impartial fact
finder. The specific sections must regulate prosecutor conduct and
constrain the behavior of over-zealous prosecutors during an investiga-
tion.
1. A Definition of the Investigating Attorney's Mission
The code must contain a general definition of the role played by
the investigating prosecutor. These types of provisions are "idealized
and hortatory in nature." 352
 These provisions are likely to direct the
investigating attorney's attention to the fact that her role is not to
advocate, but to discover facts with a detached evaluation. The general
provisions should act as a reference point through which all of the
subsequent provisions are viewed.
Within that definition, the drafters must include the role of truth-
seeker. Judge Frankel aptly noted that lawyers never talk of loyalty to
truth in the same laudatory terms as they exalt loyalty to the client." 3
35°As stated earlier, although I am discussing federal prosecutors and the regulation of
federal investigating attorneys, my proposal would contemplate the adoption, in the future, by
state bar associations of regulations which recognize the non-adversarial role played by an
attorney in the pre-charging stage of a case. It is not a stretch of the imagination for a state
prosecutor of the future to and more of her resources devoted to pre-charging conduct and to
become intertwined into the investigation of crimes much as the federal prosecutor has slowly
become more involved in that stage of the crime.
3.51 For a discussion on the comparative worth of general versus specific regulations, see
Zacharias, supra note 3, at 223.
352 Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Elide's, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 378 (1994).
353 1n discussing Lord Brougham's famous words regarding his loyalty to his client, judge
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In the investigation of a case, the seeking of truth must be paramount
to the investigating attorney. 351 As Justice Jackson noted, a prosecutor
must "search for truth, not victims."" 5
For purposes of illustration, I would suggest to the drafters a
provision which contains the following language:
A prosecutor, during the pre-indictment stage of a case, should
act as an impartial fact finder, and not as an advocate. In that
role, the prosecutor should:
(a) Actively seek all evidence, whether the evidence is favor-
able or unfavorable to any specific individual.
(b) Exercise independent judgement in determining the ex-
istence of Facts and the interpretation of those Facts.
(c) Assure that all investigations which are being conducted
under the attorney's supervision are conducted in accord-
ance with the safeguards of the Bill of Rights as implemented
by legislation and the decisions of the courts)'
(d) Evaluate, prior to presentation to a judicial official, all
search and arrest warrant applications and affidavits, and
assure that all exculpatory evidence is present in the affidavit.
(e) Fairly and impartially exercise the discretion to investigate
any person, and not improperly favor or discriminate against
any person.
Each part of the provision looks to direct the prosecutor's atten-
tion to the importance of neutrality at this stage of the case. Although
each of these provisions are covered by other rules, it is important that
they be included in the provisions regarding the non-adversarial inves-
tigative attorney in order to highlight the areas where impartiality is
importan t.
2. Specific Provisions Addressing the Investigator's Non-Adversarial
Behavior
In addition to the general definition section regarding the inves-
tigator, specific issues that concern the investigating prosecutor should
be addressed. For illustration purposes, I suggest only some of the areas
Frankel noted, "There are, 1 think, no comparable lyrics by lawyers to The Truth." Frankel, .supra
note 116, at 1036.
551 1n saying that the search For truth must be paramount, that is not to suggest that the
prosecutor should ignore the law and the defendant's rights in the search. However, it does mean
that, within the bounds of the constitutional law, the prosecutor should examine the evidence to
determine what actually happened, not just find evidence that supports a predetermined result.
"5 Jackson, .supra note 92.
356 STANDAROS MK CRIMINAL jusnc E, PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-3.1 clot. (1992).
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in which provisions should be adopted. Those areas include constraints
on contacting represented and unrepresented individuals, the factors
to be considered prior to beginning an investigation (including prohi-
bitions, if any, against targeting individuals rather than crimes), and
provisions which enumerate the obligation of the prosecutor to protect
the basic rights of individuals regardless of the anticipated use of their
testimony.
The area of contacting represented persons has been dealt with
by the DOJ in the adopted code of regulations. 357
 The portions of the
regulations which deal with the pre-indictment stage of a case should
be included in the ethics code sections for investigating attorneys. The
distinctions between adversarial actions of the investigating attorney,
such as discussions regarding agreements, and non-adversarial actions,
such as conducting undercover investigations, should be maintained
and expanded to include all conversations dealing with the settlement
of the case. Additionally, a section should be created which deals with
regulations regarding contact with unrepresented individuals. This
section of the provisions should recognize the effect the prosecutor's
status may have on the individual's ability to communicate and reflect
the prosecutor's obligations to treat the individual fairly, regardless of
status.
The drafters of these non-adversarial code provisions should enu-
merate a list of factors that a prosecutor should consider when under-
taking an investigation. Several such lists already exist, including the
ABA Criminal Standards358
 and the National District Attorney Stand-
ards. 3r'" No standards currently exist, however, regarding the investiga-
tion stage. Considerations should be given to the distinction between
the charging decision and the decision to pursue an investigation. At
the time of charging, the prosecutor has substantially more informa-
357 See supra tem accompanying notes 306-10.
Y'8 The Standards set thrill the following factors as illustrative:
1. The prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
2. The extent of the harm caused by the offense;
S. The disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular
offense or offender;
4. Possible improper motives of a complainant;
5. Reluctance of the victim to testify;
6. Cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others; and
7. Mailability' and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3.1 (1992).
ArroRNEYs Ass'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDA tuts Standard 43.6
(2d ed. 1991) (listing 17 different factors to be considered in charging decision, including many
of those listed by ABA and additional factors directly related to impact of prosecution on society).
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Lion than in the initial stages of the investigation. Therefore, the
sufficiency of the evidence is not of primary importance at the inves-
tigation stage. The prosecutor should be required to evaluate the
investigation independently of the investigating agency and consider
such factors as:
1. The source of the original information;
2. The motivation of the investigating agency;
3. The impact of the investigation on citizens, regardless of the
outcome of the investigation;
4. The impact. of the alleged offenses on the community;
5. Excessive cost of the investigation in relation to the likelihood
of discovering evidence; and
6. The likelihood that further investigation will lead to evidence
of a crime.
Further, Professor Uvillier proposed a code section articulating
the important motivational considerations which should guide a prose-
cutor when targeting a criminal rather than a crime. He proposed that
the prosecutor:
should affirmatively seek the evidence to support a prosecu-
tion where in his judgement the well being of the community
is seriously threatened by illegal enterprise or by the criminal
activities of an identifiable person or persons, notwithstand-
ing the fact that such crime or criminal has thus far escaped
detection or arrest." `i0
This provision would be helpful in guiding the drafters in the
creation of a provision which permits the investigation of individu-
als based on proper motivation.
Finally, the investigating provisions should include a section which
prohibits an attorney from counseling, encouraging or condoning the
violation of any individual's civil rights as enumerated in the Constitu-
tion and interpreted by case law. This prohibition would be in effect
regardless of whether the prosecutor anticipates using the evidence
elicited from the individual. As an example, law enforcement has been
known to elicit confessions from individuals in violation of the prescrip-
tions of Miranda, knowing full well that the evidence will not be usable
in court but merely for their own self- fulfillment. 36 ' Such actions by a
prosecutor should be prohibited by the code of ethics.
361)113611er, .supra note 72, at 1154.
361 SPAT UViiier, SUPra note 172, at 1137 (discussing practice of some police officers to obtain
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The provisions for the investigating attorney must not only satisfy
the need for guidance but also appear to be fair to the public. 3'2 The
provisions must guide the investigating prosecutor through an area
which is unnatural for the adversarial lawyer. It must place prosecutors
on notice that they must leave certain weapons for battle at the front
gate of the investigation and pick them up once their "adversarial
position is solidified." 363
CONCLUSION
In every battle there emerges a winner and a loser. In the adver-
sarial process, the loser is often times the search for truth. Although
the American criminal justice system recognizes other goals and justifica-
tions for the system, finding the truth remains a primary goal of the
system. In the investigation of a criminal case, seeking the truth must
be of paramount importance to the players in the system, especially
the prosecutor. The prosecutor must not act as an advocate during the
investigation, but must sit as a neutral fact finder and non-adversarial
evaluator of the evidence. The current ethics codes for attorneys fail
to recognize the distinctive roles played by attorneys who are investi-
gating a case. In order to enforce and guide investigating attorneys,
specific sections of the code must be added to address this role.
confession after invocation of Miranda rights, knowing that statement can only be used to put
police officer's mind at rest that he has correct person).
"62 See generally Patrick Longan, Civil Trial Reform and the Appearance of Fairness, 79 MAN.
L. Rev. 295 (1995) (discussing importance in government of not only reality of fairness, but also
perception of fairness).
y''3
 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 600 (1972).
